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ABSTRACT 
 
The law forbids discrimination. But the ambiguity of human decision-making often makes it 
extraordinarily hard for the legal system to know whether anyone has actually discriminated. To 
understand how algorithms affect discrimination, we must therefore also understand how they affect the 
problem of detecting discrimination. By one measure, algorithms are fundamentally opaque, not just 
cognitively but even mathematically.  Yet for the task of proving discrimination, processes involving 
algorithms can provide crucial forms of transparency that are otherwise unavailable.  These benefits do 
not happen automatically.  But with appropriate requirements in place, the use of algorithms will make it 
possible to more easily examine and interrogate the entire decision process, thereby making it far easier 
to know whether discrimination has occurred.  By forcing a new level of specificity, the use of algorithms 
also highlights, and makes transparent, central tradeoffs among competing values. Algorithms are not 
only a threat to be regulated; with the right safeguards in place, they have the potential to be a positive 
force for equity.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
The law forbids discrimination, but it can be exceedingly difficult to find out whether human beings have 
discriminated.1 Accused of violating the law, people might well dissemble. Some of the time, they 
themselves might not even be aware that they have discriminated. Human decisions are frequently opaque 
to outsiders, and they may not be much more transparent to insiders. A defining preoccupation of 
discrimination law, to which we shall devote considerable attention, is how to handle the resulting 
problems of proof.2 Those problems create serious epistemic challenges, and they produce predictable 
disagreements along ideological lines. 
 
Our central claim here is that when algorithms are involved, proving discrimination will be easier – or at 
least it should be, and can be made to be. The law forbids discrimination by algorithm, and that 
prohibition can be implemented by regulating the process through which algorithms are designed. This 
implementation could codify the most common approach to building machine learning classification 
algorithms in practice, and add detailed recordkeeping requirements.  Such an approach would provide 
valuable transparency about the decisions and choices made in building algorithms – and also about the 
tradeoffs among relevant values. 
 
We are keenly aware that these propositions are jarring, and that they will require considerable 
elaboration. They ought to jar because in a crucial sense algorithms are not decipherable – one cannot 
determine what an algorithm will do by reading the underlying code. This is more than a cognitive 
limitation; it is a mathematical impossibility. To know what an algorithm will do, one must run it.3 The 
task at hand, though, is to take an observed gap, such as differences in hiring rates by gender, and to 
decide whether the gap should be attributed to discrimination as the law defines it.  Such attributions need 
not require that we read the code.  Instead, they can be accomplished by examining the data given to the 
algorithm and probing its outputs, a process that (we will argue) is eminently feasible.  The opacity of the 
algorithm does not prevent us from scrutinizing its construction or experimenting with its behavior – two 
activities that are impossible with humans.4  
 
Crucially, policy changes are needed to realize these benefits, such as the requirement that all the 
components of an algorithm (including the training data) must be stored and made available for 
examination and experimentation. It is important to see that without the appropriate safeguards, the 
prospects for detecting discrimination in a world of unregulated algorithm design could become even 
more serious than they currently are.  
 
                                                
1 For an instructive account in the constitutional context, see David A. Strauss, Discriminatory Intent and the Taming of 
Brown, 56 U. CHI. L. REV.935 (1989). On the general problem, see Audrey Lee, Unconscious Bias Theory in Employment 
Discrimination Litigation, 40 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 483 (2005). 
2 See, e.g., McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973); Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977 
(1988). 
3 See Michael Sipser, Introduction to the Theory of Computation (2012).  For a discussion of some of these issues in a legal 
setting, see also Deven R. Desai and Joshua A. Kroll, Trust But Verify: A Guide to Algorithms and the Law, 31 HARV. J.L. & 
TECH. 1 (2017). 
4 We employ this dichotomy – processes where decisions are made by algorithms and ones where decisions are made by 
humans – to make the issues clear. In practice, there can be a hybrid, with humans overriding algorithmic judgments with their 
own. These hybrid processes will clearly have the two elements of each process we describe here, with the additional 
observation that, with proper regulation, we can see the exact instances where humans overrode the algorithm.  
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Our starting point is the current American legal system that has developed a complex framework for 
detecting and regulating discriminatory decisions.5 It is increasingly clear that this framework must be 
adapted for regulating the growing number of questions – involving hiring, credit, admissions, criminal 
justice – where algorithms are now involved in how public and private institutions decide.6 Algorithms 
provide new avenues for people to incorporate past discrimination, or to express their biases and thereby 
to exacerbate discrimination. Getting the proper regulatory system in place does not simply limit the 
possibility of discrimination from algorithms; it has the potential to turn algorithms into a powerful 
counterweight to human discrimination and a positive force for social good of multiple kinds.  
 
We aim here to explore the application of discrimination law to a particularly important category of 
decisions: screening decisions, where a person (or set of people) is chosen from a pool of candidates to 
accomplish a particular goal, as when college students are admitted on the basis of academic potential or 
defendants are jailed on the basis of flight risk. 7 Algorithms can be used to produce predictions of the 
candidate’s outcomes, such as future performance after acceptance of a job offer or admission to an 
academic program. We focus on one kind of machine learning algorithm often applied to such problems, 
which uses training data to produce a function that takes inputs (such as the characteristics of an 
applicant) and produces relevant predictions.8 The terminology here can be confusing since there are 
actually two algorithms: one algorithm (the ‘screener’) that for every potential applicant produces an 
evaluative score (such as an estimate of future performance); and another algorithm (the ‘trainer’) that 
uses data to produce the screener that best optimizes some objective function.9 The distinction is 
important and often overlooked; we shall emphasize it here. 
 
The existing legal framework for these types of screening decisions is necessarily shaped by practical 
considerations involving the typical difficulty of uncovering human motivations. Simply knowing that 
there is a disparity in hiring outcomes is not enough to determine whether anyone has discriminated.10  
Perhaps there are genuine differences in average performance across groups.11 A central aspect of the 
legal challenge is to determine how and why the hiring decisions were made and whether protected 
personal characteristics, such as race and gender, played a role.12  Deciding whether there has been 
discrimination is difficult for one obvious and one less obvious reason. The obvious reason is generic to 
any legal system: people dissemble, obfuscate, and lie. The less obvious reason is that people may not 
even know themselves.  
 
A large body of research from behavioral science, described below, tells us that people themselves may 
not know why and how they are choosing – even (or perhaps especially) when they think that they do.13 
                                                
5 For a clear, recent treatment, see Solon Barocas & Andrew D. Selbst, Big Data's Disparate Impact, 104 CAL. L. REV. 671 
(2016).  
6 This point has been made by a large and growing literature in computer science. While the literature is vast, some canonical 
papers include Cynthia Dwork et al., Fairness Through Awareness, PROCEEDINGS OF THE 3RD INNOVATIONS IN THEORETICAL 
COMPUTER SCIENCE CONFERENCE 214, 214-26 (2012); Solon Barocas & Andrew Selbst, Big Data’s Disparate Impact, 104 
CALIF. L. REV. 671 (2016) and the curated set of studies assembled at Scholarship, FAIRNESS, ACCOUNTABILITY, AND 
TRANSPARENCY IN MACHINE LEARNING, https://www.fatml.org/resources/relevant-scholarship (last visited Jan. 14, 2019).  
7 For one example, see Jon Kleinberg et al., Human Decisions and Machine Predictions, 133 Q.J. ECON. 237 (2018). 
8 See id.  
9 There are clearly other kinds of algorithms and decisions, and they will require an independent analysis.  
10 See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). 
11 See Lee, supra note; Tristin K. Green, Making Sense of the McDonnell Douglas Framework: Circumstantial Evidence and 
Proof of Disparate Treatment under Title VII, 87 CALIF. L. REV. 983 (1999).  
12 See, e.g.,  Corning Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 US 188 (1974). 
13 See Richard E. Nisbett & Timothy DeCamp Wilson, Telling More Than We Can Know: Verbal Reports on Mental 
Processes, 84 PSYCHOL. REV. 231 (1977). 
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Many choices happen automatically; the influences of choice can be subconscious; and the rationales we 
produce are constructed after the fact and on the fly.14 This means that witnesses and defendants may have 
difficulty accurately answering the core questions at the heart of most discrimination cases: What 
screening rule was used? And why? Even the most well-intentioned people may possess unconscious or 
implicit biases against certain groups.15 
 
In contrast, a well-regulated process involving algorithms stands out for its transparency and specificity: 
it is not obscured by the same haze of ambiguity that obfuscates human decision-making. Access to the 
algorithm allows us to ask questions that we cannot meaningfully ask of human beings. For any 
candidate, we can ask: “How would the screening rule’s decision have been different if a particular 
feature (or features) of the applicant were changed?”  We can ask exactly which data were made available 
for training the algorithm (and which were not), as well as the precise objective function that was 
maximized during the training. We will show that, as a result, we can attribute any observed disparity in 
outcomes to the different components of the algorithm design or conclude that the disparity is due to 
structural disadvantages outside of the decision process.  In a nutshell: For the legal system, discovering 
“on what basis are they choosing?” and “why did they pick those factors?” becomes much more feasible. 
 
It would be naïve – even dangerous – to conflate “algorithmic” with “objective,” or to think that the use of 
algorithms will necessarily eliminate discrimination against protected groups.16 The reliance on data does 
not provide algorithms a presumption of truth; the data they are fed can be biased, perhaps because they 
are rooted in past discrimination (as, for example, where past arrest records are used to predict the 
likelihood of future crime).17  It would also be naive to imagine that the specificity of algorithmic code 
does not leave room for ambiguity elsewhere. Algorithms do not build themselves. The Achilles’ heel of 
all algorithms is the humans who build them and the choices they make about outcomes, candidate 
predictors for the algorithm to consider, and the training sample. A critical element of regulating 
algorithms is regulating humans.18  Algorithms change the landscape – they do not eliminate the problem. 
 
 
A. Implications of Our Framework 
 
Five points are central to our analysis of discrimination law in an age of algorithms. First, the challenge of 
regulating discrimination is fundamentally one of attribution. When a screening process produces a 
disparity for a particular group, to what do we attribute that gap? It could come from the screening rule 
used. Perhaps the screening rule explicitly takes account of gender. Perhaps the chosen objective – the 
outcome the screening rule aims to optimize – disadvantages women (or some other protected group). 
Perhaps the disparity comes from the set of inputs made available to the screener. Perhaps the screening 
rule fails to optimize for a given outcome using the inputs. The answers to these questions may or may 
not be relevant, depending on what the pertinent law considers to be “discrimination.” 
 
Importantly, the disparity may not result from any of these problems with the screening rule itself. It 
could also be the consequence of average differences in the outcome distributions across groups. For 
                                                
14 See Timothy Wilson, Strangers to Ourselves (2004). 
15 See Mahzarin Banjali & Anthony Greenwald, Blind Spots (2013). 
16 See Barocas & Selbst, supra note. 
17 See id.; Sandra G. Mayson, Bias In, Bias Out, 128 YALE L.J. (forthcoming 2019), available 
at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3257004; Sharad Goel et al., The Accuracy, Equity, and Jurisprudence 
of Criminal Risk Assessment (2019), available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3306723. 
18 As another example, in some cases, humans may choose to override the algorithm and this re-introduces human ambiguity. It 
is worth noting here that we can see when these overrides arise. 	
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example, if some groups truly have worse access to K-12 schooling opportunities – perhaps their schools 
have lower levels of resources – then their college application packets may be less strong on average. 
Decomposing the source of disparities in screening decisions can be enormously difficult, but it is critical 
for determining when legal remedies should be applied, and which ones. 
 
Second, this decomposition becomes easier once an algorithm is in the decision loop. Now the decisions 
we examine are far more specific than “why was this particular candidate chosen?”  For example, a key 
input into the training algorithm is a choice of objective – given the data, the trainer must produce a 
screening rule that identifies people predicted to do well on some outcome (for example, salespeople 
expected to have the highest revenues generated). Algorithms are exceedingly sensitive to these choices.19 
In searching for discrimination, the legal system may or may not make it important to ask, “Was the 
training algorithm given an appropriate outcome to predict?” The ability to ask this question is a luxury: 
Instead of trying to infer why a salesperson was hired, the algorithm's objective function provides us with 
such information. 
 
The luxury of this knowledge unlocks the power of scrutiny: was this a reasonable choice of outcome?20 
The same point holds for the other key choices for the trainer. Of course, the ability to obtain the relevant 
knowledge requires (and we argue for) a high degree of transparency. At a minimum, these records and 
data should be stored for purposes of discovery. Algorithms do not only provide the means to scrutinize 
the choices we make in building them, they demand that scrutiny: it is with respect to these choices that 
human bias can creep into the algorithm. 
 
Third, such scrutiny pays a dividend: if we regulate the human choices well, we might be willing to be 
more permissive towards how the algorithm uses information about personal attributes in certain ways. 
When we ensure human choices are made appropriately, some of the concerns that animate the existing 
legal framework for human discrimination are rendered moot for the algorithm. Suppose, for example, 
that college applications require recommendations from high school teachers. Any racial bias by teachers 
could lead to differences in average letter quality across race groups. Interestingly, in some cases the best 
way to mitigate the discriminatory effects of biased data is to authorize the algorithm to have access to 
information about race.21 To see why, note that only an algorithm that sees race can detect that someone 
from a given group has better college grades than their letters would suggest, and then adjust predicted 
performance to address this disparity. Yet much of the time, considerations of factors like race is what 
antidiscrimination law seeks to prevent (though in this setting, the legal result is not entirely clear).22  
 
Fourth, algorithms will force us to make more explicit judgments about underlying principles. If our goals 
are in tension – as, for example, if admitting more minority students into an elite college would reduce 
first-year GPAs because of disparities in K-12 school quality or other structural disadvantages – the 
                                                
19 See Kleinberg et al., supra note.  
20 We are bracketing, for the moment, the question whether that is legally relevant. 
21 Jon Kleinberg, Jens Ludwig et al., Algorithmic Fairness, 108 AM. ECON. REV. PAPERS & PROCEEDINGS 22 (2018). See also 
Talia Gillis and Jann Spiess, Big Data and Discrimination, U. Chi. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2019), available at 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3204674.  
22 See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 800, 811 (1995). One possible response to this 
example is to argue that if the data contain bias, we simply should not use them at all. But in many applications, it is difficult to 
imagine any alternative to data-driven decision-making. In the case of mortgage lending, for instances, absent information 
about the current income or assets of a borrower, or prior repayment history, on what basis should a lender decide risk?  A 
middle-ground approach might be only to use those data that are not so biased, but as argued above, the algorithm has a much 
greater chance of being able to tell which data elements contain a differential signal for one group relative to another than 
would any human being. 
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algorithm precisely quantifies this tradeoff. And we must now articulate a choice. What tradeoff do we 
find acceptable? We will now be in a position to grapple with such questions quantitatively.23  
 
Our fifth and final point is that if appropriate regulation can protect against malfeasance in their 
deployment, then algorithms can become a potentially powerful force for good: they can dramatically 
reduce discrimination of multiple kinds. A variety of research shows that unstructured decision-making is 
exactly the sort of environment in which implicit biases can have their biggest impact.24 Of course it is 
true that in building an algorithm, human beings can introduce biases in their choice of objectives and 
data; importantly, they might use data that are themselves a product of discrimination. But conditional on 
getting objectives and data right, the algorithm at least removes the human bias of an unstructured 
decision process. The algorithm, unlike the human being, has no intrinsic preference for discrimination, 
and no ulterior motives.  
 
And this might not even be the source of the most important gains for disadvantaged groups. In many 
contexts, efficiency improvements alone have large disparate benefits for members of such groups. For 
example, Kleinberg et al. examine pre-trial release decisions in New York, and find that algorithms better 
distinguish low-risk from high-risk defendants.25 By prioritizing the highest-risk people to detain, it 
becomes feasible in principle to jail 42% fewer people with no increase in crime.26 The biggest benefits 
would accrue to the two groups that currently account for nine of every ten jail inmates: African-
Americans and Hispanics.  
 
We develop these points at length, beginning with an exploration of discrimination law, the relevance of 
principles from behavioral science, and the tensions introduced into this framework by the use of 
algorithms.27 Our central claim, stated in simple form, is that we do not need safeguards against 
algorithms; we need safeguards against the biases of the people who built them. We must scrutinize and 
regulate those choices, to ensure that algorithms are not being built in a way that discriminates 
(recognizing the complexity and contested character of that term).  If we do that, then algorithms go 
beyond merely being a threat to be regulated; they can also be a positive force for social justice. 
 
 
II. The Law of Discrimination: A Primer 
 
Discrimination law has long been focused on two different problems. The first is disparate treatment; the 
second is disparate impact. The Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution,28 and all civil rights laws, 
                                                
23 See infra for details. 
24 For evidence, see Crystal S. Yang, Free at Last? Judicial Discretion and Racial Disparities in Federal Sentencing, 44 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 75 (2015); Alma Cohen & Crystal S. Yang, Judicial Politics and Sentencing Decisions, AM. ECON. J.: ECON. 
POL’Y (forthcoming 2018). 
25 See Jon Kleinberg et al., Human Decisions and Machine Predictions, 133 Q.J. ECON 237 (2018). 
26 Id.  
27 We are building on an emerging line of research connected to developments in computer science, including valuable recent 
work by Barocas and Selbst that seeks to situate algorithms within the framework of discrimination law. See Barocas & Selbst, 
supra note. 
28 See Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 US 254 (1986). 
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forbid disparate treatment.29 The Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution does not concern itself with 
disparate impact,30 but some civil rights statutes do.31   
 
Disparate treatment. The prohibition on disparate treatment reflects a commitment to a kind of 
neutrality.32 For example, public officials are not permitted to favor men over women or white people 
over black people. Civil rights statutes forbid disparate treatment along a variety of specified grounds, 
such as race, sex, national origin, religion, and age.33  
 
In extreme cases, the existence of disparate treatment is obvious, because a facially discriminatory 
practice or rule can be shown to be in place (“no women may apply”).34 In other cases, no such practice or 
rule can be identified, and for that reason, violations are more difficult to police.35 A plaintiff might claim 
that a facially neutral practice or requirement (such as a written test for employment) was actually adopted 
in order to favor one group (whites) or to disfavor another (Hispanics).36 To police discrimination, the 
legal system is required to use what tools it has to discern the motivation of decision-makers.37 To 
paraphrase the Supreme Court, the key question under the Equal Protection Clause is simple: Was the 
requirement or practice chosen because of, rather than in spite of, its adverse effects on relevant group 
members?38 That question might be exceedingly challenging to answer, but the law makes it necessary to 
try.39 
 
It is important to see that the disparate treatment idea applies whether discrimination is taste-based or 
statistical.40 An employer might discriminate (1) because he himself prefers working with men to working 
with women; (2) because the firm’s coworkers prefer working with men to working with women; or (3) 
                                                
29 For helpful discussion, see Cary Franklin, Inventing the “Traditional Concept” of Sex Discrimination, 125 HARV. L. REV. 
1309 (2012); Elizabeth Bartholet, Application of Title VII to Jobs in High Places, 95 HARV. L. REV. 945 (1982); Miguel 
Mendez, Presumptions of Discriminatory Motive in Title VII Disparate Treatment Cases, 32 STAN. L. REV. 1129 (1980). 
30 See Washington v. Davis, 426 US 229 (1976); McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 US 279 (1987). 
31 See, e.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971); Meacham v. Knolls Atomic Power Lab., 554 U.S. 84 (2008). In 
the context of age discrimination, see Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 229 (2005). For discussion, see George Rutherglen, 
Disparate Impact, Discrimination, and the Essentially Contested Concept of Equality, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 2313 (2006); 
Richard A. Primus, Equal Protection and Disparate Impact: Round Three, 117 HARV. L. REV. 493 (2004); Samuel R. 
Bagenstos, The Structural Turn and the Limits of Antidiscrimination Law, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 4 (2006); Michael Selmi, Was 
the Disparate Impact Theory a Mistake?, 53 UCLA L. REV.. 701, 732–45 (2006).  For objections, see Michael Evan Gold, 
Griggs’ Folly: An Essay on the Theory, Problems, and Origin of the Adverse Impact Definition of Employment Discrimination 
and a Recommendation for Reform, 7 INDUS. REL. L.J. 429, 491–500 (1985).  
32 See Paul Brest, In Defense of the Antidiscrimination Principle, 90 HARV L. REV. 1 (1976). 
33 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (“It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer - 
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his 
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or 
national origin.”). 
34 Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971). 
35 See Bartholet, supra note; Christine Jolls & Cass R. Sunstein, The Law of Implicit Bias, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 969 (2006). 
36 Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976). 
37 A defining framework can be found in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). See Tristin K. Green, 
Making Sense of the McDonnell Douglas Framework: Circumstantial Evidence and Proof of Disparate Treatment under Title 
VII, 87 CAL. L. REV. 983 (1999).  
38 Personnel Adm'r of Massachusetts v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979). 
39 We are bracketing some of the differences between the Equal Protection Clause and the civil rights statutes. On the latter, see 
Green, supra note. 
40 The classic discussion of taste-based discrimination is Gary Becker, The Economics of Discrimination (1971). On statistical 
discrimination, see Edmund Phelps, The Statistical Theory of Racism and Sexism, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 659 (1972).  On the 
difference, see Jonathan Guryan & Kerwin Kofi Charles, Taste-Based or Statistical Discrimination: The Economics of 
Discrimination Returns to Its Roots, 123 ECON. J. F417 (2013); Cass R. Sunstein, Why Markets Won’t Stop Discrimination, 8 
SOC. PHIL. & POL’Y 22 (1991). 
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because customers prefer men in the relevant positions. In all of these cases, disparate treatment is strictly 
forbidden.41 Or suppose that an employer is relying on a statistical demonstration that (for example) 
women leave the workforce more frequently than men do, or that women over 50 are more likely than 
men over 50 to leave within ten years. Even if the statistical demonstration is convincing, facial 
discrimination against women, or some kind of boost for men or penalty for women, is strictly 
prohibited.42  
 
All this is relatively straightforward as a matter of law, but as a matter of principle, it raises some serious 
puzzles, to which we will return.  
 
Disparate impact. The prohibition on disparate impact means, in brief, that if some requirement or 
practice has a disproportionate adverse effect on members of protected groups (such as women and 
African-Americans), the defendant must show that the requirement or practice is adequately justified.43 
Suppose, for example, that an employer requires members of its sales force to take some kind of written 
examination, or that the head of a police department institutes a rule requiring new employees to be able 
to run at a specified speed. If these practices have disproportionate adverse effects on members of 
protected groups, they will be invalidated unless the employers can show a strong connection to the actual 
requirements of the job.44 Employers must show that the practices are justified by “business necessity.”45  
 
The appropriate justification of the disparate impact standard is widely disputed and raises fundamental 
questions about the nature of the antidiscrimination principle.46 The standard can be defended in two 
different ways.47  First, it might be seen as a way of ferreting out some kind of illegitimate motive – and 
might therefore be essentially equivalent, at the level of basic principle, to the disparate treatment 
standard. Lacking the tools to uncover bad motives, the legal system might ask: Does the manager have a 
sufficiently neutral justification for adopting a practice that has adverse effects on (say) women? If not, 
we might suspect that some kind of discriminatory motive is at work. 
 
An alternative defense of the disparate impact standard would not speak of motivation at all.48 It would 
insist that if a practice has disproportionate adverse effects on members of traditionally subordinated 
                                                
41 David A. Strauss, The Law and Economics of Racial Discrimination in Employment: The Case for Numerical Standards, 79 
GEO. L.J. 1619 (1991).  
42 This is a clear implication of Craig v. Boren, 429 US 190 (1976), and JEB v. Alabama ex rel. TB, 511 U.S. 127 (1994). For 
some complications, see Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53 (2001). See John J. Donohue III, The Law and Economics of 
Antidiscrimination Law, (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 11631, 2006), 
https://www.nber.org/papers/w11631. 
43 The defining decision is Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971). For our purposes, the full intricacies of the 
doctrine do not require elaboration. See sources cited in note supra for discussion.  
44Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971). The disparate impact standard is now under constitutional scrutiny, but we 
bracket those issues here. See Richard A. Primus, Equal Protection and Disparate Impact: Round Three, 117 HARV. L. REV. 
493, 498 (2003).    
45 See Christine Jolls, Antidiscrimination and Accommodation, 115 HARV. L. REV. 642 (2001); Jake Elijah Struebing, Note, 
Reconsidering Disparate Impact Under Title VII: Business Necessity as Risk Management, 34 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 499 
(2016); Linda Lye, Comment, Title VII’s Tangled Tale: The Erosion and Confusion of Disparate Impact and the Business 
Necessity Defense, 19 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 315 (1998).  
46 See Strauss, supra note; George Rutherglen, Disparate Impact, Discrimination, and the Essentially Contested Concept of 
Equality, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 2313 (2006). 
47 See Pamela Perry, The Two Faces of Disparate Impact Discrimination, 59 FORDHAM L. REV. 523 (1991).  
On the relevant history, see Reva Siegel, The Constitutionalization of Disparate Impact, 106 CALIF. L. REV. (forthcoming 
2019). On the theory, see Jack Balkin & Reva Siegel, The American Civil Rights Tradition, 58 U. MIAMI L. REV. 9 (2003). 
48 See Owen Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 107 (1976); Cass R. Sunstein, The Anticaste 
Principle, 92 MICH. L. REV. 2410 (1993).  
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groups, it should be stuck down, unless it has a strong independent justification.49 On this view, the 
motivation of the decision-maker is not relevant. What matters is the elimination of social subordination 
of certain groups or something like a caste system.50 The disparate impact standard does not, of course, go 
nearly that far.51 But by requiring a strong justification for practices with discriminatory effects, it tends in 
that direction.  
 
Fair representation. Some people, of course, go beyond both disparate treatment and disparate impact.  
They want members of certain groups to be chosen at socially desirable rates. Call this the principle of 
fair representation.52 The desire for fair representation may derive from numerous sources. For example, 
fair representation might have an instrumental value.53 Having greater numbers of African-Americans in 
the police force could be important if it improves the functioning of the force, whose relationship to the 
relevant community might be better if it is not entirely or mostly white.54 There may also be collateral 
benefits – including externalities – to such inclusion. Numerous economic examples fit this condition. 
African-Americans lacking past credit records may not be viable borrowers for lenders, which in turn 
means they will not ever be able to build a credit record.  Even if each individual borrower acts fairly in a 
local sense, the externality ensures a global unfairness.55   
 
The law does not concern itself with fair representation as such, and indeed an effort to pursue that goal, 
through race-conscious policies, would itself raise serious legal problems under the Constitution and civil 
rights statutes.56 Race-conscious affirmative action programs remain constitutional, but only under narrow 
conditions.57 Our only claim here is that some people think that fair representation, as such, is a legitimate 
and important goal. 
 
This discussion thus far should be sufficient to reveal that as a normative matter, the line between 
antidiscrimination principles and affirmative action is less clear than is often thought.58 Suppose that an 
employer is forbidden to take account of customer tastes (even if he deplores them), or that an employer is 
prohibited from considering statistical reality (even if he deeply wishes it were otherwise). By hypothesis, 
he is not biased in any way; he is simply trying to succeed in business. Nonetheless, he is required to 
sacrifice his own economic interests for the sake of attaining broader social goals.59 In such cases, there is 
a clear tradeoff. The sometimes-blurry theoretical boundary between anti-discrimination law and 
affirmative action policy has not posed much of an issue in a world of human decision-making, since the 
nature of the tradeoffs are hard or even almost impossible to see when so little can be quantified. But this 
changes when algorithms are introduced, as we discuss below. 
 
III. ANTI-DISCRIMINATION LAW FOR HUMANS 
                                                
49 See Ruth Colker, Anti-Subordination Above All: Sex, Race, and Equal Protection, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1003 (1986); Owen 
Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 107 (1976). 
50 Susan Carle, A New Look at the History of Title VII Disparate Impact Doctrine, 63 FLA. L. REV. 251 (2011).  
51 See Ian Ayres & Peter Siegelman, The Q-Word as Red Herring: Why Disparate Impact Liability Does Not Induce Hiring 
Quotas, 74 TEX. L. REV. 1487 (1996).  
52 This principle was at the heart of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980). 
53 See Sounman Hong, How Racial Diversity Makes Police Forces Better, WASHINGTON POST (Dec. 5, 2017), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2017/12/05/how-racial-diversity-makes-police-forces-
better/?utm_term=.7d41f485c23e. 
54 See Kathleen Sullivan, Sins of Discrimination, 100 HARV. L. REV. 78, 94 (1986). 
55 See Cass R. Sunstein, Why Markets Won’t Stop Discrimination, 8 SOC. PHIL. & POL’Y 22 (1991).  
56 See Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003).  
57 See id. 
58 See Strauss, supra note. 
59 See Sunstein, supra note. 
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We will focus throughout on a single category of decisions. Call them “screening” decisions. For 
example, a manager or team of managers must screen candidates and decide whom to hire. At its essence, 
decisions in this category are those where: 
 
• We must make a choice about people. Hire or not? Promote or not? Jail or not? Give credit to or 
not? The decision materially affects people’s lives.  
• We must use features of people within the relevant class to make this decision. What is their 
education? What is their past arrest record? How much do they earn? Have they ever defaulted on 
loans in the past?  
• There is some output or outputs the decision-makers say they care about – job performance, loan 
repayment, flight risk, public safety.  
• There is some uncertainty (at the least from the perspective of a third party or a judge) as to which 
combination of features best predicts the outcome of interest. This uncertainty is both qualitative 
and quantitative. Does height matter at all for job performance in a physical job? And how much 
exactly does occupation matter for predicting default given that we already have income data?  
 
In each of these decisions, managers will in effect, implicitly or explicitly, have a screening rule, simple 
or complex, they are using. We discuss in what follows how the law currently tries to identify and prevent 
people from engaging in discrimination. But in order to understand how and why we have developed our 
current legal rules regarding discrimination for humans, it is useful to understand first how human 
cognition works and exactly what we are worried about. 
 
A. Human cognition and biases 
 
Remarkably large numbers of Americans admit to discriminatory attitudes when asked. Among white 
respondents to the General Social Survey (GSS), 28% believe “it’s okay to discriminate when selling a 
home,” 60 34% say “blacks shouldn’t push themselves where they’re not wanted,” and 45% say “most 
blacks don’t have the motivation or willpower to pull themselves out of poverty.”61  
 
But the problems run far deeper than even these striking self-reports would suggest. This goes beyond the 
obvious problem of dissembling – we cannot trust that everyone who discriminates will tell us. The key 
lesson of a large body of psychology research tells us that people who discriminate often are not aware of 
it. Much of the time, human cognition is the ultimate “black box,” even to ourselves.62 
 
                                                
60 See The Views of White Americans, THE NEW YORK TIMES UPSHOT (2014), 
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2014/04/30/upshot/100000002853274.embedded.html. See also Bobo et al., The Real 
Record on Racial Attitudes, in SOCIAL TRENDS IN AMERICAN LIFE: FINDS FROM THE GENERAL SOCIAL SURVEY SINCE 1972 38-
83 (Peter V. Marsden ed., 2012). 
61 This is not specific to American race relations; prejudice against out-groups occurs almost anywhere there are people. For 
example, data from the World Values Survey show: 
• 35% of those in Turkey would not want to be neighbors with someone of a different religion 
• 41% of South Koreans say they would not wish to be neighbors with an immigrant 
• 66% of Russians say they would not wish to be neighbors with someone who was homosexual 
• 77% of respondents in India believe that men make for better political leaders than do women 
WORLD VALUES SURVEY, WVS Wave 6, http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/WVSDocumentationWV6.jsp?COUNTRY=875 
(last visited Jan. 16, 2019). 
62 See Wilson, supra note. 
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To understand this point and its implications for discrimination law, it will be useful to say a few words 
about psychology in general. Dual-processing theories suggest that human cognition consists of two 
families of cognitive operations: (1) deliberate, conscious thought (what is often called by psychologists 
“system II thinking”), which is effortful, and (2) rapid, automatic responses, which is not effortful, and of 
which people may not even be aware (“system I thinking”).63 Because conscious thinking requires effort, 
we tend to rely on our automatic systems to conserve mental energy.64 If someone says “two plus two,” a 
number automatically comes to mind in response to this frequently-encountered problem. If you read the 
word “bread,” you might also think “butter.”  
 
Automatic responses are not limited to these sorts of small situations; they also extend to behaviors that 
we would presume are quite mindful, such as how we interact with our social environment. For example, 
Langer, Blank and Chanowitz asked subjects in their study to make some copies.65 Just as they were about 
to do so, a confederate asked to jump in front of them. In some cases, the confederate gave no reason at all 
(“Excuse me, I have 5 pages. May I use the Xerox machine?”); in others, a reason was given (“Excuse 
me, I have 5 pages. May I use the Xerox machine, because I’m in a rush?”) The third condition had the 
veneer of a reason, but it actually had no informational content (“Excuse me, I have 5 pages. May I use 
the Xerox machine, because I have to make copies?”) People complied at similar rates to both the actual 
reason and the pseudo-reason (94% and 93%, versus 60% with no reason). What explains this finding? 
People see a situation they have seen before and their automatic response kicks in, to avoid the effort of 
processing the rest of this setting. Consistent with this view, when the costs of complying go up – when 
the confederate wants to copy 20 pages, not just 5 – compliance to the pseudo-reason is similar to what it 
is in the no-reason condition.  
 
We are often unaware of these automatic responses.66 Latane and Darley carried out experiments showing 
that people are less likely to help a stranger in need when there are relatively more people around.67 They 
then asked why subjects did not help, “every way we knew how: subtly, directly, tactfully, bluntly. 
Always we got the same answer. Subjects persistently claimed that their behavior was not influenced by 
the other people present. This denial occurred in the face of results showing that the presence of others did 
inhibit helping.”68 Subsequent research has repeatedly confirmed that we often fail to understand why we 
do what we do.69 The title of Richard Nisbett and Timothy Wilson’s influential essay from decades ago is 
prescient; in describing our own cognition, we are often “telling more than we can know.”70  
 
These implicit cognitions can sometimes even be in direct conflict with our conscious thoughts, including 
with respect to discrimination.71 The tendency to categorize people and favor “in-groups” and disfavor 
                                                
63 The literature is voluminous. For an influential summary and exposition of dual systems models in psychology, see Daniel 
Kahneman, Thinking Fast and Slow (2011).Within economics, models of dual systems thinking include Tom Cunningham, 
Biases and Implicit Knowledge (Munich Personal RePEc Archive, Working Paper No. 50292, 2013), and for impulse control, 
see Drew Fudenberg & David Levine, A Dual-Self Model of Impulse Control, 96 AM. ECON. REV 1449 (2006). 
64 Daniel Kahneman, Attention and Effort (1973), is a classic treatment. 
65 See Ellen Langer et al., The Mindlessness of Ostensibly Thoughtful Action: The Role of ‘Placebic’ Information in 
Interpersonal Interaction, 36(6) J. OF PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 635 (1978).  
66 See Geoffrey Cohen, Party Over Policy, 85 J. PERS. SOC. PSYCHOL. 808 (2003). 
67 See Bibb Latane & John M. Darley, Bystander Apathy, 57 AM. SCIENTIST 244 (1969).  
68 See id. at 124. 
69 See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 
70 See Richard E. Nisbett & Timothy DeCamp Wilson, Telling More Than We Can Know: Verbal Reports on Mental 
Processes, 84 PSYCHOL. REV. 231 (1977). 
71 On implicit bias and law, see Jolls & Sunstein, supra note. On whether implicit attitudes map onto behavior, see Hal Arkes 
& Philip E. Tetlock, ATTRIBUTIONS OF IMPLICIT PREJUDICE, 15 PSYCHOL. INQUIRY 257 (2004); Philip E. Tetlock & Gregory 
Mitchell, Implicit Bias and Accountability Systems, 29 RESEARCH IN ORG. BEHAVIOR 3 (2009). 
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“out-groups” is ubiquitous,72 and indeed the automatic system pays particularly close attention to other 
people’s sex, age and race.73 But the personal characteristics that distinguish groups do not even need to 
be so obviously distinctive. Consider the famous experiment by Sherif et al. involving two groups of 
middle-school youth at Robber’s Cave State Park in Oklahoma.74 Over the course of the study, the two 
groups (the Eagles and the Rattlers) exhibited increasingly negative views about the trustworthiness, 
integrity, and athletic skill of the other group, even culminating in aggression. This out-group hostility 
arose even though the two groups were actually formed by random assignment of a quite homogenous 
pool of white Protestant boys.75 There were no actual differences across groups that generated the out-
group hostility. All it took was to pit them against each other in a few small competitions. 
 
A major contribution of psychological research has been to show that even implicit biases can be 
measured.76 In an early study, Word, Zanna and Cooper asked study subjects – white Princeton 
undergraduates – to carry out interviews of white and African-Americans confederates.77 Study subjects 
were found to sit closer to and spend more time talking with white than African-American interviewees, 
both measures of how positively inclined one person is toward another. In a follow-up experiment, the 
subjects now were the ones being interviewed, by a set of confederates randomly assigned to do the 
interviews either the way whites were interviewed in the first experiment (sitting closer, more time) or 
how African-Americans were interviewed (further, shorter). Those interviewed as African-Americans had 
been in the first experiment were rated by observers in this second experiment as having worse interview 
responses. That is, the interviewer’s behavior changes the applicant’s responses. Beyond showing that we 
can measure implicit bias, this study also showed that these biases can create a self-fulfilling prophecy: 
people are basically creating their own reality.78 
 
                                                
72 Indeed, when meeting someone new these are typically the most likely things to be remembered about the person, and often 
the only things that are remembered. This automatic encoding may stem from the same basic cognitive processes related to 
cooperation and paying attention to social coalitions. Some evidence to this effect comes studies that create new social 
coalitions among study subjects in laboratory conditions that are unrelated to race, which seems to substantially reduce mental 
encoding of race. See Leda Cosmides et al., Perceptions of Race, 7 TRENDS IN COGNITIVE SCIENCES 173 (2003). 
73 See id.  
74 See Muzafer Sherif et al., Intergroup Conflict and Cooperation: The Robbers Cave Experiment (1961).  
75 Id.  
76 See Banaji & Greenwald, supra note. 
77 See Carl O. Word et al., The Nonverbal Mediation of Self-Fulfilling Prophecies in Interracial Interaction, 10 J. EXP. SOC. 
PSYCHOL. 109 (1974).  
78 A great deal of attention has been devoted to other ways of measuring implicit biases, such as the implicit association test, or 
IAT. See Anthony Greenwald et al., Measuring Individual Differences in Implicit Cognition: The Implicit Association Test. 74 
J. OF PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL PSYCHOL. 1464 (1998); Marianne Bertrand et al., Implicit Discrimination, 95 AM. ECON. REV. 
PAPERS & PROCEEDINGS 94 (2005). The societal consequences of implicit bias remain difficult to determine, partly because we 
only have IAT results for convenient (rather than truly representative) samples of respondents. See Arkes & Tetlock, supra 
note. But implicit bias seems to be prevalent among those who volunteer to take the tests, and some people argue that it is 
correlated with actual behavior. For example, counties or metropolitan areas with relatively higher rates of measured implicit 
bias have been shown to have higher rates of police use of force against blacks, and larger black-white disparities in low birth 
weight or preterm birth rates See Eric Hehman et al., Disproportionate Use of Lethal Force in Policing Is Associated With 
Regional Racial Biases of Residents, 9 SOC. PSYCHOL. & PERSONALITY SCI 393 (2018); Jacob Orchard & Joseph Price, County-
Level Racial Prejudice and the Black-White Gap in Infant Health Outcomes, 181 SOC. SCI. & MED. 191 (2017). One study 
administered IATs to managers in a French grocery store chain. They found that the productivity of minority workers was 
lower when they interacted with managers who had IAT scores indicating more bias. See Dylan Glover et al., Discrimination 
as a Self-Fulfilling Prophecy: Evidence from French Grocery Stores, 132 Q.J. OF ECON. 1219 (2017). It turns out managers 
with higher levels of implicit bias interacted less with minority workers, leading to reduced worker effort. This helped support 
biased manager stereotypes about minority workers being less productive – another example of a self-fulfilling prophecy. 
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In sum, with respect to human cognition we are, as suggested by the title of Timothy Wilson’s 2004 book, 
often “strangers to ourselves.”79 In important domains, human behavior often looks quite different from 
what we think of as the conscious optimization of some clear objective.  
 
Consider in this light the consequence of either conscious or subconscious bias for screening decisions.80 
When managers make a rank-ordered list of job applicants, those who discriminate by (say) gender will 
put men higher on the list than they deserve to be based on expected productivity. Managers will rank 
some lower-productivity men above some higher-productivity women because, as in the canonical 
formulation from Gary Becker, they hire a woman over a man only if her productivity advantage is large 
enough to compensate the manager for the disutility he gets from hiring a woman.81 Put differently, the 
discriminating manager creates a prioritized list of job applicants for hiring that is in some sense 
reshuffled; it is no longer rank-ordered purely by expected job performance. We now turn to the challenge 
that the law faces in determining when this type of reshuffling has taken place. 
 
B. The challenge of detecting discrimination 
 
For decades, the challenge of ferreting out illicit motivations has preoccupied analysts of discrimination 
against protected groups.82 Indeed, it may be their central preoccupation. We know that racial disparities 
exist for important outcomes such as income, wealth, credit, schooling, criminal justice, health, health 
care, and many others.83 One cause of these disparities involves people’s choices and behaviors, including 
disparate treatment. We know that because people explicitly tell us they discriminate (as in the GSS 
survey results above), and also from carefully controlled “audit studies.” For example, Bertrand and 
Mullainathan sent fictitious resumes out to a large number of employers in Boston and Chicago that were 
identical except that half had a white-sounding name and the others had an African-American-sounding 
name.84 Resumes with white names received 50% more call-backs from employers who wanted to carry 
out an interview.85 
 
But that evidence for discrimination is statistical. Without more, it cannot establish disparate treatment 
with respect to any individual decision. This question about what the former can tell us about the latter is 
                                                
79 Timothy D. Wilson, Strangers to Ourselves: Discovering the Adaptive Unconscious (2004). 
80 As briefly noted in the text, differential treatment on grounds of race, sex, and other factors can arise even when people are 
not trying to express personal animosity, but merely looking out for the bottom line. Suppose that an employer favors whites 
over African-Americans, not because he wants to discriminate (he does not), but because his customers like dealing with 
whites, and he does not want to lose money. Or suppose that a firm relies on a statistical demonstration that on average women 
leave the workforce more frequently than men do. If a hiring manager cannot tell which specific women are more likely to 
leave, then – if turnover is bad for the bottom line – a profit-maximizing company might use gender as a proxy for the 
propensity to leave. This is an example of what economists call “statistical discrimination.” See, e.g., Kenneth Arrow, The 
Theory of Discrimination, in DISCRIMINATION IN LABOR MARKETS (Orley Ashenfelter & Albert Rees eds., 1973); Edmund 
Phelps, The Statistical Theory of Racism and Sexism, 62 AM.ECON. REV. 659 (1972). Statistical discrimination might be good 
for the firm, but it penalizes women (including those who are at low risk of leaving the firm themselves). Under the Equal 
Protection Clause and civil rights laws, it is generally unlawful to discriminate on the basis of customer preferences or to 
engage in statistical discrimination, even if these are profit-maximizing. See Strauss, supra note. 
81 See Gary S. Becker, The Economics of Discrimination (2nd ed. 1971) (1957).   
82 Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning With Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317 
(1987); Strauss, supra note. 
83 See for example Stanford Center on Poverty and Inequality, State of the Union, 2017, 
https://inequality.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/Pathways_SOTU_2017.pdf  
84 See Marianne Bertrand & Sendhil Mullainathan, Are Emily and Greg More Employable Than Lakisha and Jamal? A Field 
Experiment on Labor Market Discrimination, 94 AM. ECON. REV. 991 (2004).  
85 See id. 
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at the heart of the debate about the defining case of McCleskey vs. Kemp.86 An African-American 
defendant convicted of killing a white police officer and then sentenced to death challenged his sentence 
by citing statistical evidence that capital punishment was administered at a relatively higher rate in cases 
with a black offender and a white victim. The Court rejected the challenge and insisted on the need for 
proof of discrimination in the particular case. It objected that the plaintiff’s claim “that these statistics are 
sufficient proof of discrimination, without regard to the facts of a particular case, would extend to all 
capital cases in Georgia, at least where the victim was white and the defendant was black.”87 
 
Here is another way to understand the problem. Consider the fact that African-Americans constitute 15% 
of all college-age young people but that only 6% of all students enrolled at top private universities in the 
US.88 This disparity seems more than sufficient to conclude there are important barriers somewhere in 
American life. But for the purposes of the law, we must identify a concrete decision that we believe was 
affected by discrimination, so that we can name a defendant. Was it the college admissions committee? Or 
someone else more “upstream” in the process whose decisions contributed to disparities in K-12 learning 
opportunities? The frequent inscrutability of human decision-making, combined with the relative rarity of 
explicit archival evidence (memos, verbal statements) of discriminatory motives, makes violations 
difficult to police.89  
 
Without some kind of formal discrimination (“no women need apply”90) or a “smoking gun” document, 
the only other direct way to tell whether someone discriminated in a specific case may be to ask them.91 
Even setting aside the risk they lie, as noted above, they honestly might not even know themselves. Many 
screening decisions in practice do not involve any sort of formula or guidelines, but instead are largely (or 
entirely) subjective. A manager may tell us they selected applicants for hiring because they seemed like 
“good workers.” That could mean almost anything. And given the black-box nature of human cognition, 
even cooperative managers may not be able to explain it. Nor may they be able to articulate what 
predictor variables for future productivity were used, or why those were chosen over other candidate 
predictors. And given the possibility of implicit bias, can every manager really say in good faith “I did not 
pay attention to gender (or race, etc.) in making my decision”? In the analogy to algorithms raised in the 
introduction, we cannot understand the choices that went into the “trainer” that creates the screening rule 
the person used. Statistical tests are quite complex.92 
 
The black-box nature of the human mind also means that we cannot easily simulate counterfactuals. If 
hiring managers cannot fully understand why they did what they did, how can even a cooperative 
manager answer a hypothetical about how he would have proceeded if an applicant had been of a different 
race or gender? And if it is hard to imagine a counterfactual that involves changing a major salient 
personal characteristic of that kind, what hope do we have for a counter-factual entailing some 
incremental change to a different, less salient qualification like educational attainment or years of work 
                                                
86 481 U.S. 279 (1987). 
87 See id. at 296. 
88See Jeremy Ashkenas, et al., Even With Affirmative Action, Blacks and Hispanics Are More Underrepresented at Top 
Colleges Than 35 Years Ago, THE NEW YORK TIMES, (Aug. 24 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/08/24/us/affirmative-action.html.  
89 See Carle, supra note. An influential treatment is Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning 
With Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317 (1987). 
90 Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971). 
91 Statistical measures may of course be relevant. See Barbara Norris, A Structural Approach to Evaluation of Multiple 
Regression Analysis as Used to Prove Employment Discrimination: The Plaintiff's Answer to Defense Attacks of "Missing 
Factors" and "Pre-Act Discrimination," 49 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBLEMS 63,  65.; Kingsley Browne, Statistical Proof of 
Discrimination, 68 WASH. L. REV. 477 (1993). 
92 See id. 
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experience? Put differently, not only can we not readily understand the “trainer” behind the human’s 
decision, we may also be unable to understand the “screener” that was actually used. 
 
Of course, courts have developed tools for addressing these challenges, including statistical analysis.93 If 
we cannot get a meaningful answer from people about what they did, we might at least try to reconstruct 
their decision-making by interrogating data, as courts often do.94 But a data-driven investigation faces its 
own challenges.95 For example, it can be difficult for judges to know whether a screening rule treats 
equally productive candidates the same when they cannot really measure output, but only qualifications. 
Consider how difficult defining the “output” of a job is even for a relatively simple occupation like, say, 
retail cashier. Is output the fraction of days worked where the cash register and recorded sales balance 
out? Or how often the worker shows up on time, not late? Or how often customers come back to the 
store? Or total sales more generally? 
 
What if we focused on qualifications? With the aid of existing tools,96 determining whether applicants 
with the same qualifications are treated the same may be helpful or even sufficient, but it runs into the 
problem of which qualifications matter. Attempts to focus on those qualifications that are most predictive 
of output runs into the problem of measuring output. We might be tempted to solve this problem by 
comparing applicants who are the same on every qualification. But this can often lead to a very long list. 
And in many cases there are just not that many people actually hired into a given job by a given firm over 
a given time period. If we have, say, 10 people hired into a job over the past 5 years but 20 plausibly 
relevant qualifications, it becomes impossible to tell if a firm really hired someone from an advantaged 
group over a “similarly qualified” person from a disadvantaged group.  
 
With these questions, we do not mean to suggest that the problem of ferreting out discrimination is 
insuperable. A great deal of illuminating work casts light on that problem and on potential solutions.97 
The only point is that when human behavior is involved, it can be extremely challenging to ascertain 
relevant motivations and hence to see whether disparate treatment was at work. 
 
We have seen that in the face of a demonstration of disparate impact, statistical evidence alone is not 
enough to conclude there was unlawful discrimination; the defendant is given a chance to provide some 
qualitative evidence of a justifiable, neutral reason for the disparity (such as “business necessity”).98 For 
example, imagine that the head of a private security firm institutes a rule requiring new employees to be 
able to run at a specified speed. If these practices have disproportionate adverse effects on some group, 
such as women, they will be invalidated unless they can show a strong connection to the actual 
requirements of the job. 
 
Notice this takes us back not only to the difficulty of defining and measuring “output,” noted above, but 
more generally puts judges and jurors in the position of having to make potentially difficult judgments 
                                                
93 Kevin Tobia, Note, Disparate Statistics, 126 YALE L.J. 2260 (2017); Michael O. Finkelstein, The Judicial Reception of 
Multiple Regression Studies in Race and Sex Discrimination Cases, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 737 (1980). 
94 See Segar v. Smith, 738 F.2d 1249 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 2357 (1985); supra note.  
95 D. James Greiner, Causal Inference in Civil Rights Litigation, 122 HARV. L. REV. 533 (2008).  
96 See supra note.  
97 See Greiner, supra note; Michael O. Finkelstein, The Judicial Reception of Multiple Regression Studies in Race and Sex 
Discrimination Cases, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 737 (1980); Delores A. Conway & Harry V. Roberts, Regression Analyses in 
Employment Discrimination Cases, in STATISTICS AND THE LAW 107 (Morris H. DeGroot et al. eds., 1986); David C. Baldus & 
James W.L. Cole, Statistical Proof of Discrimination (1980).  
98 On the dynamics, see Barocas & Selbst, supra note; Linda Lye, Commentary, Title VII’s Tangled Tale: The Erosion and 
Confusion of Disparate Impact and the Business Necessity Defense, 19 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 315 (1998); Amy L. Wax, 
Disparate Impact Realism, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 621 (2011).  
16 
 
about the best way to carry out some task that is far from their own expertise. The head of the security 
firm, for example, argues that the ability to run fast is an important part of the job. He notes that there is 
variability in the running speed of suspects, and variability in the distance of foot-chases, but he believes 
that a security guard who could run 1.5 miles in 12 minutes should be able to catch the suspect in “most” 
chases. It is challenging for judges to decide on the merits whether any of the security firm head’s 
assertions are correct. It is no wonder, in these circumstances, that much of the debate turns on an 
institutional question: how aggressively the legal system should scrutinize those assertions.99 
 
IV. ALGORITHMS AND HOW THEY WORK 
 
One way to think about the goal of prediction is to overcome a missing information problem. A firm gets 
applicants for some job. To decide whom to hire, it would like to know each applicant’s productivity if he 
or she were hired. But that information is “missing,” in the sense that the applicant has not yet worked for 
the firm; this is the crux of the question in hiring. Our best guess for what will happen in the future often 
is what happened in the recent past. So a natural way to fill in (predict) the missing information about the 
future performance of current job applicants is to look at the performance of “similar” job applicants 
whom the firm has hired before. The algorithm in this sense is functioning as a data summarizer. 
 
A. Two Algorithms, Not Just One 
 
We often refer to anything that involves data and the resulting prediction as an “algorithm.” But as we 
have noted, this misses the fact that there are actually two separate “algorithms” in any screening rule 
application of the sort that we consider here.  
 
One algorithm – what we call the screener – simply takes the characteristics of an individual (a job 
applicant, potential borrower, criminal defendant, etc.) and reports back a prediction of that person’s 
outcome. This prediction for the person’s outcome then feeds into a decision (hiring, loan, jail, etc.).  
 
The second algorithm – what we call the trainer – is the thing that produces the screening algorithm. This 
involves (among other things) deciding which past cases to assemble to use in predicting outcomes for 
some set of current cases, which outcome to predict, and what candidate predictors to consider.  
 
The distinction between these two separate algorithms is often under-appreciated but is actually quite 
important in practice: 
 
• People often worry that the algorithm could be doing literally anything, including unforeseen 
things that introduce bias.100 This concern shows up when, for example, people worry about using 
machine learning in situations where standard statistical tools like logistic regression have been 
used to inform predictions for years.101 Recognizing there are actually two algorithms helps clarify 
that conditional on the choices that go into constructing the trainer, the screener cannot do 
“literally anything” – it is mechanically the result of whatever human decisions were made for the 
trainer. 
 
                                                
99 See Kevin Tobia, Note, Disparate Statistics, 126 YALE L.J. 2260 (2017). 
100 Some of these concerns are noted and addressed in Goel et al., supra note. 
101 See id. 
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• The distinction between the screener and trainer is also important for detecting and regulating 
discrimination, since the way we would carry out audits and monitoring is different for the two 
algorithms (as discussed further below). 
 
B. What situations do (and do not) fit this framework 
 
We have in mind situations where the decision we are examining is made many times, so that the training 
algorithm has enough cases to learn the relationship between the candidate predictors and the specified 
outcome. This means that algorithms will be better for “micro-prediction” tasks, such as hiring, than for 
“macro-prediction” tasks, such as who will win a presidential election.102  
 
Our framework is relevant to situations where the training algorithm, screening algorithm and training 
dataset are all fixed, stored objects that can be inspected. In cases where the criterion for the decision is 
changing at a rapid rate – as in many online learning applications, like Google search or online ad 
placement – new training observations flow in at a massive rate, and the training algorithm is constantly 
running to produce new screeners. Things move so quickly in these settings that screeners, trainers and 
underlying training data samples may not even be stored in a way that would suffice to reconstruct a 
snapshot of the system at every instant. This means we cannot go back and examine what the training 
algorithm would have done under different choices. A new legal framework, on the statutory side, might 
require companies to begin to store the inputs to its algorithms even in settings like this, a point to which 
we return below. 
 
The settings for which our framework is currently relevant affect many people’s lives and accounts for a 
large share of total economic activity each year, settings such as education, hiring, criminal justice, and 
health care. These decisions do not just have important stakes for society; they are also ones where the 
United States has had long-standing concerns about the possibility of discrimination.103 
 
C. How algorithms work  
 
We discuss the mechanics of how algorithms work within the context of a concrete example: hiring. The 
basic steps to constructing a training algorithm involve the following components.104 
 
• Collecting a dataset 
• Specifying a concrete outcome to be predicted in that data set 
• Deciding which candidate predictors to construct and make available to the algorithm to be 
considered for inclusion in the final statistical model 
                                                
102 A related reason why machine learning tools are better for “micro-prediction” than “macro-prediction” is that these 
algorithmic procedures are useful only to the extent to which the new data for which we seek to make predictions are generated 
by the same underlying data-generating process that produced the data we use to train the algorithm. If the world is 
fundamentally changing over time, an algorithm built to understand the relationship between X and Y in one state of the world 
may not carry over to a new state of the world. This assumption of some basic stability to the world is plausible in situations 
where, for instance, we use data on yesterday’s credit card applicants to predict default risk of tomorrow’s applicants. But this 
can break down when we predict low-frequency events like, say, US presidential elections, where the nature of the underlying 
political dynamics may be changing and we only have one data point every four years to try to discern those changes. 
103 See, e.g., supra note.  
104 Textbook treatments of the basic road map for training prediction algorithms can be found in C. Bishop, Pattern 
Recognition and Machine Learning, (2006) and T. Hastie, R. Tibshirani, & J. Friedman, The Elements of  
Statistical Learning: Data Mining, Inference, and Prediction (2nd edition, 2009). 	
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• Building a procedure for finding the best predictor, which uses all the other variables to predict the 
outcome of interest. The result is the screener: we give the screening algorithm a given set of job 
applicant characteristics, it gives back a prediction of the outcome for that applicant 
• Validating the procedure in a “hold out” set – a data set that was not used to train the algorithm on. 
 
The first two steps involve critically important human choices that shape what the algorithm does, and 
hence the degree to which it might discriminate. For that reason, we discuss them in much greater detail 
below within the context of regulating algorithmic discrimination, and touch on them only briefly here. 
 
The dataset on past workers can be thought of like a spreadsheet, with each row being someone whom the 
firm hired in the past. One or more columns would be measures of how each worker performed on the 
job. The remaining columns might capture application data that can serve as candidate predictors. The 
human building the algorithm makes decisions about which set of workers to include in the dataset (the 
rows), and which outcomes and candidate predictors (columns) to invest resources into collecting as well. 
 
The next step is to specify the outcome the algorithm should predict. A human hiring manager might say 
they are just looking for people who will be “good workers.” But for the people building a training 
algorithm, it is necessary to be more specific. Suppose we are hiring new police officers. When we look at 
past officers, we can see that some of them are good at making arrests, while others are good at 
developing rapport with the community. If we specify arrests as the key outcome of interest for the 
training algorithm, we will wind up ranking highly those current applicants who would be good at making 
arrests in the future and skew the composition of the department towards people like this. So what 
outcome is specified, or how different outcomes are weighted together for a “productivity index,” matters 
critically for what the algorithm does and the hiring process that results. 
 
The third step is deciding which candidate variables to make available to the algorithm to be considered 
for inclusion in the final statistical model. This might include, for example, the construction of new 
variables from ones that are in the original dataset (like constructing body mass index using height and 
weight). It also includes decisions about whether the algorithm should not even have the option to 
consider some candidate predictors in the final model, because for example they suffer from severe 
measurement error or are disallowed for legal reasons. 
 
The fourth step is the procedure that determines which of the candidate predictors that have been collected 
should be used in predicting the outcome of interest. Given how important human decisions are in the 
choice of training data and outcome to predict, it is natural to assume that human judgment plays a 
critically important role here, too. Indeed, in discussing algorithms that might be used, for instance, to 
help rank-order police applicants, we find many people ask questions like: Who exactly will be 
constructing this algorithm? Have they ever been part of the police force? Or lived in a distressed 
neighborhood where the stakes for picking the right police officers are particularly high? How do we 
know the algorithm’s programmer will not make misguided choices in deciding what factors to use in 
predicting the outcome?  
 
But this step – deciding which candidate predictors to include in the statistical model, given a full set of 
candidate predictors and a choice of outcome to predict – is actually the one step in building the training 
algorithm where the human usually does not play so much of a role, or at least plays a role very different 
from the one that many people imagine. A key feature of machine learning is that the data themselves are 
used to determine what predictors to include in the final prediction model.105 If being left-handed is 
                                                105	Id.	
19 
 
unrelated to performance as a police officer, in the training dataset of past police who have been hired we 
would see that left- and right-handed officers would have similar values of the outcome variable on 
average – and so the algorithm would choose not to use it as a predictor. If there are instead big 
differences in average performance of past officers by, say, college degree receipt, the training algorithm 
would be more likely to select that as a predictor for the final model.  The algorithm can only select from 
among the candidate predictors made available to it by its human designers, but given the choice of 
training data and outcome, it is the underlying relationships between the variables in the training data that 
determines which predictors wind up in the screener, and how much weight they get; it is basically just a 
statistical matter of which variables are most correlated with the outcome.  
 
This helps us see that it is not the case the training algorithm could do “literally anything” at this step. 
Another way to think about what the algorithm is doing at this step is to use the candidate predictors (job 
application information) to group past workers together based on who has similar job performance. We 
then essentially predict the future performance of current applicants as being something like the average 
performance of past workers in the same group.  
 
This type of “grouping” is at the heart of prediction, whether that prediction is done by a human being or 
by an algorithm. The whole idea of prediction is sometimes viewed as objectionable because it has the 
flavor of profiling. But if we truly believed that every job applicant was fundamentally different from 
everyone else, then there is literally nothing we could say about how they would perform on the job 
unless we actually hired them and observed what happens. If we really thought people were so 
idiosyncratic that we could never learn anything about them from observing what happened with anyone 
else, there would be no way to develop a “Joseph Michael Smith, DOB 1/1/1980” predictor – because 
there is only one such person. If we gave up on the prediction, on what basis would hiring be done at all?  
Moreover, as have noted above, the designers of the algorithm have the ability to specify, and thereby 
restrict, the set of candidate predictors available for the procedure to consider. The alternative to machine 
prediction is some combination of much-less-accurate human prediction, and other subjective human 
decision-making of the sort that is fraught with risk of bias. 
 
A final question we might have is: How do we even know that these algorithms actually work? This is 
why the last step in the process is so critically important – we must validate the algorithm’s performance 
in a new dataset that the algorithm has not seen yet during the algorithm training process. Consider the 
Netflix Challenge, where research teams competed to develop the most accurate possible prediction 
model in response to a publicly available dataset.106 The only reason the Netflix prize competition worked 
was that the company made one dataset available to research teams to develop their prediction models on, 
but then evaluated their performance on a separate dataset that was not made public. Imagine Netflix had 
made the hold-out set public. We would be worried that if the competing teams had access to the hold-out 
set, they would simply try a vast number of candidate algorithms until they stumbled across one that 
happened to fit the idiosyncrasies of that particular dataset well, rather than uncover a generalizable way 
in which nature works that would show up consistently across different datasets. In many applications we 
do not have the same level of control over the hold-out set, and so have no choice but to trust the 
algorithm builder not to have looked at the hold out set during the algorithm construction stage. 
 
This description of how the training algorithm works also makes clear why the choice of screening 
algorithm is in some sense the inevitable byproduct of statistical principles once the choice of outcome, 
candidate predictors, and training dataset have been made. The real fear with algorithms is not what 
                                                
106 For an outline, see RM Bell and Y. Koren, Lessons from the Netflix Prize Challenge,  9 SIGKDD EXPLORATIONS 95 
(2007). 
20 
 
happens inside the algorithmic “black box.” The training algorithm is in some sense the opposite of a 
black box; the algorithm summarizes the data according to the data given to it and the outcome that is 
specified. It is those human choices where the potential for problems, including discrimination, really 
arise. 
 
D. What the algorithm cannot do 
 
The training algorithm is better at prediction than it is at causal inference.107 It is designed to identify a 
collection of predictors that help predict the outcome as accurately as possible among a new set of 
observations. Suppose there are multiple candidate predictors in a dataset that are highly correlated with 
one another – for example, given the high levels of racial segregation that persist in the US, race might be 
highly correlated with both neighborhood of residence and high school attended. An algorithm will pick 
whatever subset of them happen to be most useful for prediction purposes, but may not include all of the 
correlated variables. One implication is that if we see a predictor included in the model, we cannot tell 
whether it is that predictor or some other correlated predictor that is actually causally affecting the 
outcome.108 Another implication is that if we see an algorithm that does not include a protected personal 
attribute like race in the final model, that does not mean that a correlated proxy for race is not playing a 
role. It is worth underlining this point: An algorithm that is formally blind to race or sex might be using a 
correlated proxy. Whether that is a problem, for legal purposes, depends on the governing legal standard. 
It is more obviously relevant to a disparate impact claim than to a disparate treatment claim.  
 
There is a different way in which the algorithm is better for prediction than causation. Suppose we are 
trying to predict performance on the job at some firm that has created a hostile workplace environment for 
women. Because of that hostile environment, we may see lower levels of productivity on average for 
women the firm has hired in the past compared to men.109 Changing the firm’s workplace to make it more 
accepting and accommodating for women may well improve the average productivity we see among 
future female hires,110 but the algorithm cannot speak to this possibility. The algorithm is a tool designed 
for prediction (how do women do at this type of workplace?), not causal inference (what happens if we 
change the work environment?). 
 
Another important limitation is that we can train the algorithm only using observations for which we 
observe the outcome. We cannot observe productivity on the job at some firm for, say, women if women 
never apply to that place to work (as they might not if the firm has a hostile workplace). We also cannot 
observe productivity on the job for women at some firm if the firm never hires women. This limitation 
implies that past choices have a powerful impact on prediction, by determining for whom we have 
outcome values. We return to this point in the next section when discussing the important role played by 
the human choice of training data to give to the algorithm. 
 
Recall that the training algorithm can only optimize whatever outcome, candidate predictors and training 
data are given to it. The flip side is that this is all the algorithm does. It has no ulterior motives or hidden 
agenda. And much of what it does is transparent to us. 
 
                                                
107 See Jon Kleinberg et al., Prediction Policy Problems, 105 AM. ECON. REV. 491 (2015). 
108 Id. 
109 For relevant evidence and discussion, see Amna Anjun et al., An Empirical Study Analyzing Job Productivity in Toxic 
Workplace Environments, 15 INT. J. ENVIRON. RES. PUBLIC HEALTH 1035 (2018). 
110 Id. 
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That is unlike with the human being. Eye-tracking studies of how HR personnel screen resumes tell us 
that the average hiring manager spends an average of merely six seconds looking at each resume, with 
80% of the time spent on just six items.111 How people decide which factors to look at, or how to weight 
them together, remains largely a mystery.  
 
 
V. WHERE DISCRIMINATION CAN (AND CANNOT) ARISE WITH THE 
ALGORITHM 
 
One concern with algorithms is that they may seem technocratic and dispassionate in a way that creates 
the veneer of unimpeachable objectivity. But as we have noted in the previous section, given the 
important role that human decisions play in the construction of algorithms, it would be irresponsible – 
even dangerous – to confuse “data-driven” with “nondiscriminatory,” “unbiased,” or “objective.”112 In 
what follows, we outline how discrimination in the human choices about outcomes, candidate predictors, 
and training procedures can infect the resulting algorithm; as we demonstrate in the Appendix to the 
paper, the overall level of discrimination can be fully decomposed into contributions from these three 
components. We also discuss ways in which we might worry that algorithms might be discriminating, but 
are not really; these sorts of misconceptions can lead to restrictions that are well-intentioned but 
ultimately counter-productive. 
 
It may be useful, by way of preface, to distinguish among four kinds of problems. First, the algorithm 
might be engaging in disparate treatment – as, for example, if it considers race or gender and 
disadvantaged protected groups (perhaps because racial or gender characteristics turned out to be relevant 
to the prediction problem it is attempting to solve). Second, the algorithm might be producing a disparate 
impact – as, for example, if it considers some factor whose usage disproportionately burdens members of 
protected groups (say, certain kinds of test scores). Third, the algorithm might be considering some factor 
that is itself a product of past discrimination (as might be true, for example, of credit scores or arrest 
records). The law does not concern itself with this problem except insofar as it reflects disparate treatment 
or can make out a case of disparate impact in the relevant domain, but it might nonetheless be counted as 
a problem. Fourth, the algorithm might produce an imbalance of a kind that many people find 
objectionable. The law is not concerned with this problem, at least not by itself,113 but many people would 
be concerned to see that an algorithm ends up giving (for example) some benefit to women far less than to 
men. 
 
A. Where discrimination can arise with algorithms 
 
1. Choice of outcome 
 
We noted above that what outcome to predict, or how to weight together different outcomes, is one of the 
critical choices that must be made in building the training algorithm.  The choice of outcome is non-trivial 
even in the simplest of examples. Consider for example a data-entry firm, where employee output seems 
easily quantified through the amount of data entered. Even here, a firm might choose to measure output 
through number of hours at work – arguing that an unused computer is a wasted resource. Such a choice is 
                                                
111The six items are: Name; current title and company; previous title and company; previous position start and end dates; 
current position start and end dates; and education. See THE LADDERS, Keeping an Eye on Recruiter Behavior (2012), 
https://cdn.theladders.net/static/images/basicSite/pdfs/TheLadders-EyeTracking-StudyC2.pdf. 
112 See Goel et al., supra note. 
113 Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980). 
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non-trivial since home-life differences may lead to gender differences in hours at work.114 Gender 
differences that are bigger for some outcomes than others open the door to intentional bias by the 
algorithm constructor. It is possible that the case is one of disparate treatment. It might instead involve 
disparate impact. 
 
Disparate impact could easily be introduced inadvertently. Perhaps the most important way in which this 
could arise is if the training algorithm is asked to predict a human judgment, rather than an external 
measure of the underlying outcome of interest itself. Suppose for instance that instead of predicting how 
productive a worker is on the job in the future, an algorithm is asked to make screening decisions based 
on the people who were hired in the past. Any human bias in past hiring decisions will then be baked into 
the algorithm itself.  This is a form of biased data that the algorithm builder may or may not be aware of, 
but is quite pervasive – arising, for example, with manager assessments of worker performance, or with 
customer ratings of workers. Use of such data could well give rise to disparate impact and, on certain 
assumptions, could constitute disparate treatment as well. 
 
2. Choice of predictors to collect, construct, and give to the trainer to consider 
 
Both disparate treatment and disparate impact can also be introduced through decisions about what 
candidate predictors to collect, construct, and give to the training algorithm to consider for possible 
inclusion in the final statistical model. For example, an employer that is screening applicant resumes 
might believe that college quality could matter in predicting worker performance. It might then invest 
time to assemble US News rankings of four-year colleges (which whites attend at relatively higher rates) 
without investing the same effort in measuring rankings of two-year colleges or for-profit universities 
(which black students attend at relatively higher rates).115  
 
The problem can arise not just when the firm collects information that is more favorable to one group than 
another, but also when the firm simply collects too little information overall. For instance, imagine that a 
firm collects information about where applicants attended high school, but does not collect any 
information about how someone did in high school. High schools continue to be highly segregated on the 
basis of race in the United States, and minority students continue to attend high schools of lower average 
quality than those attended by whites.116 If academic performance is positively related to performance on 
the job, an algorithm trained using just data on where someone went to high school might have fewer 
minorities ranked highly on the hiring list than would one that also collected information about individual 
student performance. Additional information on academic outcomes allows the algorithm to identify those 
students who manage to do well in high school despite having attended a disadvantaged, under-resourced 
school. 
 
The human algorithm builder might also choose to collect candidate predictors that are human judgments, 
rather than objective measures of reality, and these can lead to difficulties in much the same way that 
using human judgments as outcome variables can cause problems. Consider the problem of predicting 
who will do well in college, as a way to inform admissions decisions. Many, or even most, selective 
schools rely on teacher recommendation letters as part of the admissions process. But previous research 
                                                
114 As another example, among financial analysts previous research suggests men on average may have slightly more accurate 
earnings forecasts than women, but women have better overall professional reputations. See Clifton Green et al., Gender and 
Job Performance: Evidence from Wall Street, 65 FIN. ANALYSTS J. 6 (2009).  
115 Almanac 2018, Racial and Ethnic Distribution of Students Among Higher Education Sectors, Fall 2016, THE CHRONICLE OF 
HIGHER EDUCATION, (Aug. 19, 2018), https://www.chronicle.com/article/Distribution-of-Students-Among/244069. 
116 See Linda Darling-Hammond, Unequal Opportunity: Race and Education, BROOKINGS, (March 1, 2018), 
https://www.brookings.edu/articles/unequal-opportunity-race-and-education/. 
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suggests that teachers have biases that run along both gender and race lines.117 Using teacher 
recommendations to predict student performance may bake teacher bias into the university’s prediction of 
the college performance of applicants.  
 
3. Choice of training procedure 
 
Finally, once the designers of an algorithm have chosen an outcome measure and a set of input variables, 
they need to run a training procedure based on past data in order to produce the screener.  Discrimination 
can easily be introduced in this phase, deliberately or unintentionally.  Perhaps most simply, the designers 
could under-optimize in the training phase and produce a screener that helps some groups and hurts others 
while only poorly approximating the intended outcome measure.  Such under-optimization, which could 
amount to disparate treatment, should be detectable by a separate party auditing the firm’s procedures if 
they are provided with the choices of outcome, input variables, and training data, since they could then 
run their own version of the training procedure and see if they obtain a significantly more accurate 
approximation to the intended outcome measure. 
 
The more subtle, complex routes for discrimination in the training procedure tend to arise through the 
choice of the training dataset used to produce the screening.  At the most basic level, humans may in 
principle deliberately introduce discrimination into the algorithm through their construction of the training 
data. Suppose a firm wanted to establish a “bad track record” for minority workers to avoid hiring them in 
the future. It could intentionally select the least productive minority workers from its applicant pool for 
some period of time.118 Using the data on how these workers performed on the job to train an algorithm 
would then predict a disparity in worker productivity even if minority and white applicants in the larger 
population are equally productive.  
 
Beyond these relatively extreme examples, there are many ways in which the choice of training sample 
could also inadvertently produce some kind of problem, possibly in the form of disparate impact. Suppose 
that we are trying to predict college success to inform admission decisions. We use as training data a set 
of records from a university that has a campus climate hostile to female students. This would depress 
observed academic performance of women and hence lead to systematic disparities in predicted 
performance of future college applicants from these groups.119 
 
A major problem that occurs repeatedly, and is often overlooked, is that we can only predict outcomes 
using training observations about those for whom we observe the outcome. Suppose we have a firm to 
which women simply do not apply (perhaps because it has a hostile workplace environment toward them), 
or the firm just does not hire many women (for one reason or another). This means we sometimes have to 
rely on very small samples to estimate predictions for some groups, and will predict outcomes for the 
majority group more accurately. 
 
                                                
117 See Thomas S. Dee, Teachers, Race and Student Achievement in a Randomized Experiment, 86 THE REV. OF ECON. & STAT. 
195 (2004); John J. Donohue III, The Law and Economics of Antidiscrimination Law, (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, 
Working Paper No. 11631, 2006); Victor Lavy & Edith Sand, On The Origins of Gender Human Capital Gaps: Short and 
Long Term Consequences Of Teachers’ Stereotypical Biases (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 20909, 
2015). 
118 See Dwork et al., supra note. 
119 Of course, if we had a training sample from multiple college campuses and collected some information about how minority 
or female students rated their experience at different places, the algorithm would have an opportunity to learn that 
disadvantaged groups perform less well at universities that have a hostile campus climate against them. 
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A subtler problem arises from the fact that our datasets for applications like hiring are filtered through 
past decisions (who applies, who gets hired), and the humans who make those decisions often have access 
to information that is not captured in any dataset (for example, what happens during an in-person 
interview). Suppose we have a man in charge of hiring for a firm who feels threatened by women who are 
“too competent.” As a result, he hires women only if they had below-average interviews. If interview 
performance is correlated with performance on the job, an algorithm trained using data just on those 
women who get hired will understate the performance of women relative to men for a given set of 
observable applicant characteristics.  
 
This critically important problem – what we called the selective labels problem – has received relatively 
little systematic investigation in both the scientific literature and practical applications of algorithms to 
social science or policy settings.120 The solution to this problem is likely to require combining insights 
from computer science with the sort of “natural experiment” research designs developed in social 
science.121 
 
Note that if we took any of the training datasets described above and asked humans to learn about the 
relationship between the outcome and the candidate predictors, they would likely form impressions that 
are mistaken in the same way that the algorithm would. Put differently, the discrimination that gets 
introduced into the training algorithm from biased training samples is not indicative of a problem with 
what the algorithm is doing, but rather with the skewed data itself.  
 
B. Where discrimination is unlikely to originate with algorithms 
  
Having now seen the three fundamental ways in which discrimination can arise in the design of the 
algorithm, we return to the converse point (developed more formally in the Appendix): any discrimination 
in the algorithmic screening can be fully decomposed into contributions from these three sources.  This 
means, in particular, that a number of other dimensions of the algorithm’s behavior do not represent 
avenues for potential discrimination to originate.  It is useful to list some of these explicitly, as they form 
the basis for common misconceptions about algorithmic bias. 
 
1. Discriminatory selection of what candidate predictors to include in prediction function 
 
Observers often worry that literally anything could happen within the machine learning black box, which 
could in turn lead to discrimination.122 This concern can be seen, for instance, in objections to the use of 
machine learning algorithms for prediction tasks that have long relied on standard statistical tools like 
logistic regression.123 But if the algorithm designer has fixed the outcome, the set of available input 
variables, and the training procedure, then standard machine learning algorithms will select the subset of 
input variables that optimize the resulting estimate of the outcome measure.  There should be a genuine 
concern whether the designer may have omitted a crucial variable from the available input that the 
training algorithm considers for inclusion in the screener, or included variables whose use constitutes 
                                                
120 See Kleinberg et al., supra 7. 
121 For an excellent overview of the natural experiment style of data analysis, see, e.g., Joshua Angrist & Jörn-Steffen Pischke, 
Mostly Harmless Econometrics: An Empiricist’s Companion (2009). For an example of how this type of research design can be 
combined with machine learning predictions to overcome the selective labels problem, see Kleinberg et al., supra 7.  
122 See, e.g., Yavar Bathaee, The Artificial Intelligence Black Box and The Failure of Intent and Causation, 31 HARV. J. L. 
TECH. 889, 920 (2018). 
123 For relevant discussion, see Michael L. Rich, Machine Learning, Automated Suspicion Algorithms, and the Fourth 
Amendment, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 871 (2016); David Lehr and Paul Ohm, Playing with the Data: What Legal Scholars Should 
Learn About Machine Learning, 51 U. C. DAVIS L. REV. 653 (2017). 
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discrimination as described above, but less of a concern that the training algorithm will include the wrong 
variables from the set of available options when it produces the final screener.  Not coincidentally, this 
step of choosing the optimal subset from among the available input variables is a part of the process that 
is data-driven, rather than closely programmed by a human. 
 
Of course, the algorithm designer could always choose to introduce discrimination manually at this stage 
by deviating from the standard pipeline for building the screener. Nothing that we have said rules out the 
possibility that a discriminatory algorithm builder might try to hide something deep in the code that 
intentionally reduces the predicted level of future productivity for every female job applicant. Or, as noted 
above, the algorithm builder might under-invest in the machine learning engineering that is required to 
derive the most accurate prediction function possible with a given dataset. The fact that machine learning 
requires skill and effort to optimize is what gives rise to competitions like the Netflix Challenge described 
above.124 
 
But if the outcome, the input variables, and the training data are made available, there is a natural 
approach for detecting this type of deliberate discrimination, given that the optimization of the training 
algorithm is a data-driven process that should be determined by the underlying statistical relationship in 
the data between the outcome and the candidate predictors.  Specifically, third parties could run their own 
training procedure from the same starting point and determine whether they are able significantly to 
improve on the firm’s predictions. Malfeasance here is relatively feasible to detect, and hence it should be 
correspondingly feasible to deter. 
 
2. The screener algorithm 
 
Recall that the design of a prediction algorithm for a screening problem involves two algorithms: the 
trainer and the screener.  Our discussion thus far has been about the trainer, and the multiple ways in 
which discrimination can be introduced through the choice of outcome, input variables, and training 
procedure.  Once we have accounted for all these components, the screener itself has essentially been 
determined: we should think of it as the mechanical result of applying a training procedure to an outcome, 
a set of input variables, and a set of training data. By itself, it cannot add more bias than what has 
appeared in the construction procedure that led to it, via the routes discussed above.   
 
With this in mind, consider what disparate treatment looks like. For hiring, an HR manager might do 
something like rank-order a less-productive white applicant over a more-productive minority applicant. 
But with a training and a screening algorithm, if we have accounted for the possible sources of 
discrimination in the human’s choices for the training algorithm (outcome, candidate predictors, and 
training procedure), then there is essentially no room for the screening algorithm to discriminate beyond 
what has already been accounted for in its construction. 
 
So much, then, for disparate treatment by the screening algorithm. In the world of algorithms, that form of 
discrimination should be detectable as a deviation from the expressed specification for the algorithm’s 
behavior, so long as we have the ability to audit the training algorithm’s design and interact with the 
screening algorithm itself.  
 
Moreover, if we have access to the screening algorithm, then we need never be surprised by its decisions.  
We can simulate screening decisions for individual cases or whole populations in a way that would be 
                                                
124 See Andrey Feuerverger, Statistical Significance of the Netflix Challenge, 27 STATISTICAL SCIENCE 202 (2012); 
Bell & Koren, supra note.  
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impossible to imagine in scenarios where a human was performing the screening.  For example, we can 
ask about average rates of acceptance by the screener over subsets of the population.  We can also 
simulate counterfactuals. Given access to the operation of the screener, it is trivial to ask “With this 
screening rule, would this candidate have been hired if characteristic X had changed?” (For example, if 
certain applicants had a high school diploma instead of being high school dropouts, would their predicted 
outcome change enough to move them up enough in a firm’s rank-ordered hiring priority list to have been 
offered a job?) 
 
In all of these respects, screening algorithms are altogether different from human screeners. Far from 
being a “black box,” they are far more transparent than humans.  
 
3. Group differences in the raw data and predicted outcomes  
 
Concerns about biased data, potentially making out either disparate treatment or disparate impact, are very 
real, as we have discussed in detail above. But systematic differences across groups in the data – that is, in 
the distributions of the candidate predictors, or in the outcome variable to be predicted – are not by 
themselves proof that use of the data is discriminatory in any legally relevant sense.125 
 
We live in a world in which reality itself systematically differs across groups. For example, we know that 
women shoulder greater child-care burdens than do men.126 When we see in some dataset that women 
earn less than men, it is not necessarily the case that the data are biased in the sense that they 
systematically mismeasure reality for some groups. The underlying reality itself may be a product of 
discrimination of some kind. Or consider a dataset that shows differences in average arrest rates or test 
scores for minorities and whites.127 We know that the poverty rate in the US is twice as high for blacks 
than for whites;128 among the poor, blacks are twice as likely as whites to live in high-poverty (>40%) 
neighborhoods.129 The average net worth of black households is only about one-seventh that of whites.130 
Given the important role that family and community circumstances play in shaping people’s opportunities 
growing up, it would be remarkable if these large differences in socio-economic circumstances did not 
lead to average differences in children’s outcomes across groups. If the underlying predictors and/or 
outcomes differ systematically across groups, any well-calibrated algorithm will yield group differences 
in predictions. 
 
It is possible that we might wish to adjust our algorithmic predictions or subsequent decisions in ways that 
help address the underlying social problem.  This is not the task of eliminating bias that has been 
                                                
125 For a useful application, see David Williams & Selina A. Mohammed, Discrimination and Racial Disparities in Health: 
Evidence and Needed Research, 32 J. BEHAV. MED. 20 (2009). 
126 See Henrik Kleven et al., Children and Gender Inequality: Evidence from Denmark, (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, 
Working Paper No. 24219, 2018). 
127 See, e.g., Lauren Nichol Gase et al., Understanding Racial and Ethnic Disparities in Arrest: The Role of Individual, Home, 
School, and Community Characteristics, 8 RACE SOC. PROB. (2016); Christopher Jencks and Meredith Phillips, The Black-
White Test Score Gap: An Introduction (2013), available at https://www.brookings.edu/wp-
content/uploads/2013/01/9780815746096_chapter1.pdf.   
128 See Pew Research Center, On Views of Race and Inequality, Blacks and Whites are Worlds Apart, PEW RESEARCH CENTER: 
SOCIAL AND DEMOGRAPHIC TRENDS (Jun. 27, 2016), http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2016/06/27/1-demographic-trends-and-
economic-well-being/. 
129 See Elizabeth Kneebone & Natalie Holmes, U.S. Concentrated Poverty in the Wake of the Great Recession, BROOKINGS 
INSTITUTE (March 31, 2016)  https://www.brookings.edu/research/u-s-concentrated-poverty-in-the-wake-of-the-great-
recession/. 
130 See Edward N. Wolff, The decline of African-American and Hispanic Wealth since the Great Recession, (Nat’l Bureau of 
Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 25198, 2018). 
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introduced by the algorithm, but the task of using the algorithm to address bias and structural 
disadvantage in the world.  We return to this issue below. 
 
C. What questions we need to ask 
 
With this framework for analyzing algorithmic discrimination in place, we now ask how to ferret out 
discrimination in a new world that involves algorithms in the loop. We discuss these issues within the 
context of a concrete example (hiring), and contrast what we want out of a new regulatory framework and 
how this differs from our existing legal framework. 
 
For orientation, it is useful to situate the standard legal analysis (without algorithms) in this context.  
Suppose a woman applies to a small business for a job as a salesperson. Her application is rejected. She 
sues the firm for gender discrimination. For disparate treatment and disparate impact cases, the analysis is 
straightforward, at least in broad outcome. Recall that disparate treatment might be shown if the employer 
uses some explicit or implicit rule that treats female applicants less favorably because they are female.131 
If no such rule is in place, the applicant might try to uncover discriminatory motive; that might be 
difficult.132 Recall too that disparate impact might be shown if the employer uses some rule (for example, 
a height and weight requirement) that treats women worse than men. If so, the rule must be justified in 
some way.133 
 
If an algorithm is involved, the plaintiff’s lawyers might again seek to show disparate treatment (if, for 
example, sex is explicitly used as a factor) or disparate impact (if some factor is used that 
disproportionately harms women). In addition, a key question that the plaintiff’s lawyers would want to 
answer is this: Why did the firm (or whoever built the algorithm for the firm) choose the outcome that it 
did? One reason to ask that question is to establish disparate treatment. 
 
We have seen that asking this sort of direct question in a situation of exclusively human decision-making 
is often a challenging exercise. If the algorithm is directed to take account of sex, the issue will be more 
tractable (with one qualification to which we turn below). And with a standard prediction algorithm in the 
decision loop, whatever person builds the algorithm will have had no choice but to specify what outcome 
is being predicted – the training algorithm cannot be built without an outcome at least implicitly specified 
in the process.  
 
Moreover, the nature of how self-incrimination arises has changed. People are ordinarily reluctant to 
admit that they discriminated, not least because it subjects them to legal liability. But if the algorithm uses 
gender (or race, or sex) – even if it is merely directed to predict some outcome – disparate treatment will 
be more readily apparent. Or consider the response options for someone who has intentionally selected a 
specific, facially nondiscriminatory outcome to predict in order to discriminate. The firm that chose, say, 
on-time attendance rate as the outcome to predict might be tempted to say it was chosen because that is 
what the firm values most in its workers. That response, however, is now hemmed in by the paper trail 
that has accumulated over the years of the firm’s operations that document what the firm has focused on 
when doing annual performance reviews and making promotions. The “smoking gun” comes not from 
someone confessing discrimination, but (much easier to obtain) someone making a claim about the 
selection of an outcome that transparently conflicts with everything else the firm has been doing. 
                                                
131 See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973); Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977 (1988). 
132 See Michael O. Finkelstein, The Judicial Reception of Multiple Regression Studies in Race and Sex Discrimination Cases, 
80 COLUM. L. REV. 737 (1980). 
133 See supra note. 
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Whether the claim is based on disparate treatment or disparate impact, we might also want the plaintiffs to 
be able to compare the various choices the firm made in constructing its training algorithm to different 
relevant internal or external benchmarks, based on the three categories of discriminatory components 
discussed above:  
 
• How do the hiring disparities that result from the outcome the firm actually chose compare to the 
disparities that would have arisen if the firm had chosen other candidate outcomes for which the 
firm has data available? (This question may be relevant to disparate impact.) 
• How do the firm’s choices of candidate predictors to collect and construct compare to what other 
firms in the same industry select? (This question may be relevant both to disparate treatment and 
to disparate impact.) The motivation for this type of industry benchmark comes from evidence that 
while discrimination remains an important problem, not all firms discriminate.134 
• How does the training sample the firm used compare to the larger universe of past applicants and 
hired workers at the firm? How does it compare to the overall population? How do the statistical 
relationships between the outcome and predictors in the training sample compare to what we have 
seen in other datasets? (These questions may be relevant both to disparate treatment and to 
disparate impact.) 
 
None of these comparisons by themselves would constitute sufficient proof of discrimination by the firm. 
We need to assess the answers in view of the standards for disparate treatment and disparate impact. But 
if a firm’s choice of outcome, candidate predictors or training sample is an outlier relative to the relevant 
benchmark, we have at least suggestive evidence of disparate treatment. Or disparate impact might be 
involved. If the firm has a disparity in its hiring outcomes based on (say) choice of predictors, the burden 
might shift to the firm to justify the decisions it made in constructing the training algorithm. 
 
Notice there can be some counter-intuitive results from this type of benchmarking. Suppose we have a 
firm that proudly announces it will no longer collect information on whether applicants have a prior 
criminal record. We compare that to the industry standard and find a similar firm in the same industry and 
local labor market that proudly announces they invest substantial resources in collecting information 
about prior criminal records that is as detailed and extensive as possible. Which firm do we imagine will 
be more likely to hire African-American applicants? A growing body of research in economics suggests 
that the picture is complicated, in that suppressing information of one type (criminal record) can 
incentivize decision-makers to turn to other forms of information (race) in ways that may be overtly 
discriminatory.135 
                                                
134 In the canonical economic model of discrimination from Becker, supra note, minority workers – who are a modest share of 
the workforce in most local labor markets – will wind up seeking out and sorting into the least prejudiced set of employers. See 
Becker, supra note 24. So if employers do actually vary in their level of prejudice, and workers sort in the way that Becker’s 
model predicts, then the racial wage gap should be determined by the level of prejudice of the marginal employer. One paper 
provided some empirical evidence to support this prediction, showing that the prevalence of racial prejudice within a state or 
region (as measured by survey data from the General Social Survey) is systematically related to the size of racial wage gaps. 
See Kerwin Charles & Jonathan Guryan, Prejudice and Wages: An Empirical Assessment of Becker’s The Economics of 
Discrimination, 116 J.  POL. ECON. 773 (2008). 
135 See, e.g., Stephen Raphael, Improving Employment Prospects for Former Prison Inmates: Challenges and Policy, in 
CONTROLLING CRIME: STRATEGIES AND TRADEOFFS, (Philip J. Cook et al., eds., 2011) for studies that relate the propensity of 
firms to check criminal backgrounds with their willingness to hire black applicants, and for studies showing that 
implementation of a “ban the box” policy that restricts employers from asking about prior record seems to reduce their 
willingness to hire black applicants, see Amanda Agan & Sonja Starr, Ban the Box, Criminal Records, and Racial 
Discrimination: A Field Experiment, 133 Q. J. ECON 191 (2018); and Jennifer Doleac & Benjamin Hansen, Does ‘Ban The 
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We can also run simulated data through the training algorithm, where we know exactly what we should 
expect in the resulting screening rule, to compare the screening rule that results with what we would 
expect. For example, we might simulate a dataset where the average level of productivity for black job 
applicants is higher than for whites. If the screener that results from a given training algorithm gives us 
back a rank-ordered list of job applicants that nonetheless still hires white applicants at far higher rates 
than blacks, we would suspect there has been something hidden inside the training algorithm that leads to 
a discriminatory result, not a truly optimized algorithm. 
 
D. Problems	of	Proof:	Human	Beings	vs.	Algorithms	
 
Some of these arguments might seem difficult to assess in the abstract. A few stylized cases might 
therefore be useful by way of clarification: 
 1. A firm hires salespeople. It favors employees who will maximize sales. It ends up giving a 
preference to white applicants for one reason: it has found that the firm’s customers are more 
likely to buy from white salespeople.  2. A firm hires managers. Other things being equal, it seeks managers who will stay on the job 
for a long time. In its experience, women are more likely to leave after a short period – under 
five years – than men .  For that reason, the firm gives a preference to male applicants.  3. A state government is hiring entry-level budget analysts. It gives a preference to applicants 
from the most prestigious colleges and universities, because those applicants have done best in 
the past. The preference has a disproportionate adverse effect on African-American applicants.  4. A firm hires security guards. It believes, on the basis of its experience, that security guards 
with more than thirty years of experience do less well in the job. It therefore gives preference 
to applicants who have had fewer than thirty years of experience. The result is a disparate 
impact on older people.  
 
In all four cases, the legal analysis reasonably straightforward. In cases (1) and (2), there is unlawful 
discrimination. Case (1) involves a form of taste-based discrimination, which is unquestionably a form of 
disparate treatment, even if the firm is acting rationally.136 Case (2) involves statistical discrimination, 
which is also a form of disparate treatment. In both cases, the result is clear.137 In cases (3) and (4), we 
need to identify the governing legal standard. Suppose that disparate treatment is forbidden and that if a 
disparate impact is shown, a substantial business justification is necessary. If so, there would be a 
legitimate legal challenge in both (3) and (4), not because of disparate treatment, but because the disparate 
impact would trigger a burden of justification. 
 
While the legal analysis is reasonably straightforward, litigation might not be. For reasons we have 
discussed, the problem of proof might be formidable in cases (1) and (2): how are we to establish that race 
and gender were explicitly considered? Cases (3) and (4) might turn out to be similar. If documentary 
evidence is not available to prove the relevant preferences, a plaintiff might have to make some kind of 
statistical demonstration. That might be challenging.138  
 
                                                
Box’ Help Or Hurt Low-Skilled Workers? Statistical Discrimination and Employment Outcomes When Criminal Histories Are 
Hidden (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 22469, 2016).  
136 See supra note. 
137 See supra note. 
138 See supra note.  
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Now let us consider versions of these cases where an algorithm is used.  
 5. A firm uses an algorithm to hire salespeople. The algorithm is designed to favor employees 
who will maximize sales. It ends up giving a preference to white applicants for one reason: the 
firm’s customers are more likely to buy from white salespeople.  6. A firm uses an algorithm to hire managers. Other things being equal, the algorithm seeks 
managers who will stay on the job for a long time. Relevant data show that women are more 
likely to leave after a short period – under five years – than men are. For that reason, the 
algorithm gives a preference to male applicants.  7. A state government uses an algorithm to screen entry-level budget analysts. The algorithm 
gives a preference to applicants from the most prestigious colleges and universities, because 
those applicants have done best in the past. The preference has a disproportionate adverse 
effect on African-American applicants.  8. A firm uses an algorithm to hire security guards. Relevant data show that security guards with 
more than thirty years of experience do less well in the job. The algorithm therefore gives 
preference to applicants who have had fewer than thirty years of experience. The result is a 
disparate impact on older people.  
 
With respect to the underlying law, cases (5) through (8) are the same as cases (1) through (4). In 
principle, they should not be treated differently.  
 
The real question is whether litigation would be different and whether the plaintiff would find it easier or 
harder to solve the problem of proof.  Finding out in cases (5) and (6) whether the algorithm used an illicit 
factor (such as race or sex) should be more straightforward. Whether the algorithm was given access to 
such a factor can be seen directly in the training procedure.   
 
The problem is that even if the algorithm was not given access to information about race or sex, we can 
nonetheless have disparate treatment if the algorithm ends up favoring whites and men because of 
customer discrimination (as in case (5)) and statistical reality (as in case (6)). The real question is how to 
establish that fact. The analysis we have developed thus far suggests an approach to addressing this 
question, via the framework outlined above for making the training data, objective function, and resulting 
screening algorithm available for examination and experimentation.  We can use access to these objects to 
try determining whether the facts are as stated in the two cases – much more effectively so than in cases 
(1) and (2). 
 
In cases (7) and (8), the disparate impact issues should be equally straightforward. The existence of 
disparate impact is clear; the data will prove it, and also show its magnitude. We can also attempt to 
specify the practice that gives rise to those impacts. Then the question is the standard one: Can the 
disparate impact be justified, given the relevant standard? That is the same question that would be asked if 
an algorithm were not involved. 
 
The presence of the algorithm goes further – it makes it possible to quantify the tradeoffs that are relevant 
to determining whether there is “business necessity” (or some other justification for disparate impact). 
Algorithms by construction produce not just a single ranking of applicants. They can produce a set of 
rankings that vary based on one's tolerance for disparate impact. For each of these rankings, they 
additionally quantify their effect on the objective, such as sales. This allows us to answer exactly the 
question, “What is the magnitude of the disparate impact, and what would be the cost of eliminating or 
reducing it?”  In case (8) we can say, “What would be the effect on overall job performance if we were to 
reduce the disparate impact for every level of reduction?” The issue of the business necessity behind 
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disparate impact now becomes easier to litigate, more readily separating specious from genuine 
arguments. 
 
E. Clarifying nondiscrimination versus affirmative action 
 
Private and public institutions are motivated by two goals: ensuring nondiscriminatory behavior, 
regardless of gender, race, ethnicity, sexual orientation, or disability status, and helping members of 
disadvantaged groups – sometimes producing affirmative action, understood as preferential treatment for 
members of such groups. The latter is of course far more controversial than the former. On one view, 
affirmative action compromises the goal of nondiscrimination and is fatally inconsistent with it;139 on 
another view, the two are compatible.140 Algorithms help clarify the relationship between them.  
 
Algorithms have clearly stated objectives. There is no need to guess whether an algorithmic rule is rank-
ordering job applicants based on expected college GPA instead of by something else. Algorithms also let 
us precisely quantify tradeoffs among society’s different goals. Suppose the university admissions 
committee cares about racial diversity and also about selecting a student body that would do as well as 
possible academically, as measured by grade point average (GPA) at (say) the end of the first year of 
college. An algorithm might give us the predicted GPA for every applicant, which would let us rank-order 
all applicants and count down the list until the target number of admissions is reached. But it would also 
be possible to create separate rank-ordered lists for African-American and white applicants, which would 
allow the university to count down the list of African-American applicants until whatever diversity target 
is hit. We can then calculate what happens to average GPA of the admitted class under that hypothetical 
admissions target. Put differently, with the algorithm it is now possible to see whether there is a tradeoff 
between diversity and academic performance of the incoming class, and if so, trace out what that tradeoff 
curve looks like. 
 
There is no obvious answer to the question of whether the drop in average GPA is worth whatever 
benefits arise from improving racial diversity, and the algorithm should not be imagined to provide one.  
The key point is that the algorithm, by forcing us to specify what outcome we care about and providing us 
with a rank-ordered list of applicants by the predicted outcome, lets us precisely quantify what we would 
be giving up (if anything) to achieve these other objectives. We need a suitable legal framework to ensure 
that we can capitalize on this opportunity. 
 
F. Combating Discrimination 
 
Regulation of the algorithm requires us to be able to identify and interrogate human choices in the 
construction of the training algorithm, and specifically their decisions about: 
 
• What outcome to predict 
• What inputs (candidate predictors) to make available to the algorithm for consideration 
• The training procedure itself 
 
As a result, an important requirement for a new legal framework to prevent discrimination through the use 
of algorithms is transparency. These specific questions that come out of our framework help make clear 
                                                
139 An influential discussion is John Hart Ely, The Constitutionality of Reverse Racial Discrimination, 41 U. CHI. L. REV. 723 
(1974). 
140 See Charles Lawrence, Two Views of the River: A Challenge of the Liberal Defense of Affirmative Action, 101 COLUM. L. 
REV. 928 (2001). 
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that for the successful regulation of algorithms, transparency is not an end in its own right but rather a 
means to an end. One might say that transparency is key for any legal system, including laws built for 
purely human decision-making: we need people to be transparent about what they are doing. But given 
the limits of human cognition, even a well-intentioned person will have difficulty “handing over” what is 
asked for.  
 
In contrast, the inclusion of an algorithm in the decision loop now provides the opportunity for more 
feasible and productive transparency. Effective transparency is easier to imagine once an algorithm is 
involved, because each of the things we are now asking the firm to hand over – the choice of outcome, 
candidate predictors, training sample – is a tangible object. Each of them is, or at least could be, stored as 
part of the organization’s standard daily operations. 
 
The limits of this sort of transparency for many applications today is that several of the objects we would 
require for proper algorithmic regulation might not currently be stored by the relevant firm, particularly in 
online learning settings where data flow in at a massive volume (such as Web search or online ad 
delivery). Here is where the distinction becomes important between an engineering exercise of the sort 
data scientists normally consider as opposed to the sort of legal exercise in which we are engaged here.  
 
In the design of a legal framework to deal with potential discrimination when algorithms are involved, 
there are many options. New statutes or regulations could change data and storage requirements imposed 
on algorithmic tasks like Web search to make them subject to the sort of discrimination inquiries we 
outline here, which in turn would expand the set of applications to which this framework applies. In the 
context of a specific legal challenge to alleged discrimination, it is not impossible that courts might insist 
on such requirements in order to test whether a violation has occurred (though that would be an 
admittedly unusual and aggressive step). The costs of compliance in this case could become quite large. 
Whether those costs are worth incurring will hinge on some assessment of whether the benefits justify 
them. The history of regulation includes many cases of large record-keeping costs being imposed on 
private firms in cases where the benefits were believed to be considerable; for example, after the financial 
market crash of 2008 almost brought about the collapse of the global economy, the Dodd-Frank act 
required firms to keep records on every single transaction that occurred in the $400 trillion swaps 
market.141 That is a lot of transactions. In the abstract, it is not unreasonable to expect that if algorithms 
are being used, data and storage requirements could become automated at reasonable cost. 
 
For regulating possible discrimination within the public sector in particular there is a different challenge – 
the risk of broken procurement processes.142 Some of the organizations using algorithms to help inform 
critical decisions, particularly government agencies, lack the internal capacity to build and maintain this 
type of data-driven system.143 So they understandably turn for help to some outside organization with the 
relevant expertise.144 Those outside organizations are frequently for-profit firms. What they are selling is 
partly the implementation of their algorithm, but more importantly it is the algorithm itself. They – 
understandably, though not laudably – do not want to make the detailed workings of their algorithm 
public for fear of reducing the value of their intellectual property.  
 
                                                
141 See, e.g., Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 729, 83 Stat. 1376-2223 (2010) (prior to 1975 amendment).   
142 See Christopher Yukins, The U.S. Federal Procurement System: An Introduction (2017), available at 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3063559.  
143 For relevant discussion, see Sarrah Chraibi et al., An Exploratory Model for Outsourcing-purchasing Activities Based on a 
Comparative Study, 3 SUPPLY CHAIN FORUM 138 (2017). 
144 See id. 
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For the same reason: Once some organization has incurred all the up-front costs of building and installing 
a new algorithmic system, the outside firm has leverage that tempts it to charge high prices for updating 
the tool. If the algorithm is not regularly updated there is the risk of what Koepke and Robinson call 
“zombie predictions,” where the algorithm is built on an old dataset that reflects conditions that are quite 
different from when the predictions are now being applied.145 Yet cash-strapped agencies too frequently 
cannot or will not pay their consultants what is needed to update the models. 
 
VI. USING ALGORITHMS TO PROMOTE EQUITY 
 
Algorithms have the potential to help us to excise disparate treatment, to reduce discrimination relative to 
human decision-making, to limit disparate impacts, and also to predict much more accurately than humans 
can in ways that disproportionately benefit disadvantaged groups – what we call the “disparate benefit” of 
algorithms. 
 
A. De-bias relative to humans 
 
As we have seen, the tendency to classify others into “in-groups” and “out-groups” is a key feature of 
human psychology that contributes to explicit and implicit biases throughout society. For example, 
Bertrand and Mullainathan show that resumes with a typically African-American name are much less 
likely to receive a call-back than similar resumes that list a common white name.146 To overcome the 
effects of these human biases, we could try to exhort hiring managers to ignore irrelevant information on 
resumes. Or we could provide them with some sort of implicit bias training. But given the opacity of 
human decision-making, it would be very difficult to determine whether such efforts had actually been 
successful.147  
 
The use of an algorithm is an alternative way to try to deal with the bias of human decision-making. To 
the algorithm, the name on a resume, race, age, sex, or any other applicant characteristic are candidate 
predictors like any other: variable X42. If this variable is not predictive of the outcome, the algorithm will 
not use it. And since predicting the outcome is all the algorithm is designed to do, we do not have to 
worry about any hidden agenda on the part of the algorithm itself. And recall that if use of a characteristic 
is predictive but would violate antidiscrimination law, use of that characteristic can and should be 
prohibited. But here there is an important qualification, to which we now turn. 
 
 
B. Access to the protected variable promotes equity for the algorithm 
 
Consider a firm that is trying to decide which sales people to steer towards its most lucrative clients based 
on a prediction of their future sales level. Candidate predictors include (1) past sales levels and (2) 
manager ratings. Suppose that for men, managers provide meaningful assessments that include useful 
signals about employee performance that are not fully captured in the past sales data. But suppose that for 
women, the managers discriminate and give the lowest possible ratings. (This is of course disparate 
treatment and therefore unlawful.) An algorithm that is prohibited from knowing gender might well use 
manager ratings as a predictor, because it has a useful signal for half the sample. And because the 
                                                
145 See John Logan Koepke & David G. Robinson, Danger Ahead: Risk Assessment and The Future of Bail Reform, 93 WASH. 
L. REV. 1725-1807 (2017).  
146 See Bertrand & Mullainathan, supra note.  
147 See S.M. Jackson et al., Using Implicit Bias Training to Improve Attitudes Toward Women in STEM, 17 SOCIAL 
PSYCHOLOGY OF EDUCATION 419 (2014). 
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algorithm in this case does not know who is male and who is female, it has no choice but to assume that 
manager ratings mean the same thing for all workers. The resulting predictions would understate the 
future productivity of women and hence contribute to gender gaps in earnings. 
 
But what happens if we instead allowed the algorithm to be aware of gender? With adequate training data, 
the algorithm could detect that manager ratings are predictive of future sales for men but not for women. 
Since the algorithm is tasked with one and only one job – predict the outcome as accurately as possible – 
and in this case has access to gender, it would on its own choose to use manager ratings to predict 
outcomes for men but not for women. The consequence would be to mitigate the gender bias in the 
data.148  Clearly such a mitigating effect will not result from the use of a protected attribute in every 
situation, but we can easily find additional scenarios where similar considerations arise. 
 
For example, allowing the algorithm to have access to protected-class membership can also promote what 
many people would consider to be equity in cases where the relationship between the candidate predictors 
and outcomes differ between the advantaged and disadvantaged groups. To use an admittedly more 
controversial example, suppose that we have two college applicants who both score 1,100 on the SAT. 
One of them is from New Trier, an affluent north-shore suburb of Chicago where the median family 
income is $145,000 (three times the national average) with public schools among the nation’s best. The 
other is from Englewood, a south side Chicago neighborhood with median family income under $20,000 
and among the city’s highest homicide rates. Outside of extraordinarily unusual circumstances, it cannot 
be the case that the amount of effort, persistence, and extra learning on one’s own required to score 1,100 
on the SAT is the same for the student who starts with every possible advantage as for the one forced to 
overcome a long list of difficult obstacles.  
 
Yet when we prohibit an algorithm from having access to information about the college applicant’s 
disadvantaged group membership (in this case, let us stipulate, race as well as economic circumstances 
and background149), that is exactly what we are forcing the algorithm to assume. From the standpoint of 
current law, it is not clear that the algorithm can permissibly consider race, even if it ought to be 
authorized to do so; the Supreme Court allows consideration of race only to promote diversity in 
education.150 Whatever the law requires, many people would find it tempting to say that while the 
algorithm should focus on factors independent of race (poor neighborhood, violent crime, and so forth), it 
should not focus on race itself.151 But sometimes race itself is relevant as a predictor, and on plausible 
assumptions, there is nothing invidious about insisting on that point.  
 
                                                
148 As another example, consider a city in which half of all residents are white, half are black. Suppose that white residents and 
black residents engage in criminal activity at exactly the same rates, and that the police force in this city manages to arrest 
everyone who commits a crime. But in addition, the police department includes some discriminatory officers and as a result 
half of all arrests made to black residents are actually false arrests (that is, an arrest when the person was not reasonably 
thought to have committed a crime). In this case, the arrest rate will be higher for blacks than for whites even though true rates 
of crime are the same. Now suppose we use these data to predict failure to appear in court, or FTA, which (for the moment) we 
will assume is accurately measured. An algorithm blinded to race has no choice but to assume that the relationship between 
prior arrests and FTA risk is the same for both groups; since the rate of prior arrests is higher for blacks as whites, the race-
blind algorithm would generally predict a higher FTA risk for blacks. In contrast, an algorithm able to use race would detect in 
the data that (in our stylized example) the effect of each prior arrest on FTA risk was smaller for black residents than for 
whites; with more prior arrests for blacks than whites, the net result would be equalized predicted FTA risks for blacks and 
whites by the race-aware algorithm. 
149 We acknowledge that the stipulation is controversial. To skeptics, we emphasize that it is a stipulation. 
150 See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003). 
151 See Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003). 
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These are not just hypothetical examples; we can see them play out in actual data. In Kleinberg et al., 152 
we use data on a nationally representative sample of teens to predict college performance and simulate 
different admission decisions.153 Table 1 shows that, consistent with past studies, high school outcomes 
differ on average by race, and as a result we see differences in average college outcomes as well. Figure 1 
shows that a race-aware algorithm allows us substantially to increase the share of admitted students who 
are minority (holding average GPA constant) relative to ignoring information about race. The share of the 
admitted class that has GPA<2.75 is on the y-axis and the share that is African-American is on the x-axis. 
We show results from a race-aware algorithm, a race-blind algorithm, and an algorithm that pre-processes 
the data so that the average of all high school predictors is the same on average for white and black 
students.154 The algorithms let us rank-order applicants by predicted GPA outcome.  
 
If we do this separately by race, we can select whatever share of the incoming class we wish to be 
minority by deciding how far down the minority student list to go. The tradeoff curve is upward-sloping 
for each algorithm (more diversity, higher share GPA < 2.75), but the race-aware algorithm dominates the 
others. For example, if we wanted to hold the share of admitted students with GPA<2.75 at 14%, the 
share of admitted students who are black would be 7% with the race-blind model, 11% with the pre-
processed model, and 19% with the race-aware algorithm.  
 
Figure 2 shows why the race-aware algorithm dominates. This “heat map” shows the share of black 
students in different predicted GPA “bins” according to the race-blind (x-axis) or race-aware (y-axis) 
algorithms. Observations that lie off of the 45-degree line show the models disagree. For example, the 
race-blind algorithm says the students in the right-hand lower corner have high likelihood of GPA<2.75 
(9th decile), but the race-aware predictor (accurately) tells us they are actually in the lowest-risk decile. 
The race-blind model mis-ranks these students because the relationships between high school predictors 
of college success (such as test scores) turn out to be different for white versus black students.155  
 
This discussion highlights how the mechanical application of current antidiscrimination law to algorithms 
might actually have harmful effects on exactly those populations we seek to protect. Our goal here is not 
to offer a final view on whether and when current law would forbid decision-makers – whether human 
beings or algorithms – from explicitly considering race. It is enough to say that courts would be very 
uncomfortable with that practice, and their discomfort, in the context of algorithms at least, might well be 
a mistake. 
 
C. Disparate benefit from improved prediction 
                                                
152 The dataset we use is the US Department of Education’s National Education Longitudinal Study of 1988, which captures 
information on a nationally representative sample of students who entered 8th grade in the fall of 1988. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF 
EDUCATION, NATIONAL EDUCATION LONGITUDINAL STUDY OF 1988 (1988). Follow up surveys were conducted in 1990, 1992, 
1994 and in 2000 (when respondents were in their mid-20s). See Available Data, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, 
https://nces.ed.gov/surveys/nels88/data_products.asp.  We limit our analysis sample to those who participated in the 2000 
survey wave, and had ever attended a four-year post-secondary institution. To simplify the analysis, we focus on comparing 
just non-Hispanic white students (N=4,274) with black students (N=469). In the public-use version of the NELS we use here, 
we do not have access to ACT or SAT scores. But we do have the results of how students did on standardized academic 
achievement tests that the NELS administered to students in four academic areas: math, reading, science, and social studies. 
153 See Kleinberg et al., supra note.  
154 We might do this if, for example, we believed that systematic differences across groups in the average values of the 
predictor variables (Xs) was due to some sort of societal unfairness, or to biased data. 
155 When we use the race-blind algorithm, we force the statistical model to assume the relationship is the same for both whites 
and blacks, which distorts the predicted outcomes for black applicants. This leads us inadvertently to say some high-
performing black applicants are actually low-performing, that is, to understate their academic potential and hence reject them, 
while simultaneously admitting lower-performing black applicants instead. 
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There is a less controversial but comparably important point. The largest potential equity gains may come 
from simply predicting more accurately than humans can. This increase in accuracy can generate benefits 
that disproportionately accrue to disadvantaged groups, leading to what we call “disparate benefit.” 
 
For example, landlords in the private housing market have difficulty predicting which tenants are at high 
risk for skipping rent payments. This difficulty may lead landlords to implement blanket rules, such as 
requiring first and last month rent to protect against missed payments. For affluent renters, this is a minor 
inconvenience. But for low-income, low-wealth families, this can be the difference between leasing an 
apartment and doubling up with someone else (or even becoming homeless). Better prediction could 
allow landlords to relax collateral requirements, which would change the system in ways that helps 
disadvantaged families. 
 
Better prediction could also let us expand some systems in ways that help disadvantaged groups. 
Compared to affluent white families, low-income minority families tend to live in neighborhoods that do 
not only have higher poverty rates, but are also located further from good schools, health care and jobs.156 
This distance is particularly a problem for families who rely on public transportation, which in the US 
remains, as Pendall puts it, “slow, inconvenient, and [lacks] sufficient metropolitan-wide coverage to rival 
the automobile.”157 While car loans have increased in recent years, interest rates often remain high in part 
because of non-payment: 6 million people are at least 90 days behind on their car loans.158 High interest 
rates surely contribute to differences in car ownership by income and employment status.159 Better 
prediction of payment risk could allow lenders to lower interest rates for low-risk families and expand 
access to car ownership in ways that disproportionately benefit the disadvantaged. 
 
We are offering somewhat conjectural examples, but these potential gains are not merely conjectural. 
Consider an application where better prediction lets us shrink a system that disproportionately harms 
disadvantaged groups: pre-trial release decisions for criminal defendants.160 State law in New York 
requires judges make these decisions based on a prediction of defendant risk of failure to appear (FTA) in 
court in the future. We use data from New York City on all cases that were continued at arraignment over 
a five-year period and build a model to predict FTA risk. The predictor variables in the model consist of 
age (a legally allowable variable), current offense, and prior criminal record. The data show that the 
judges’ risk predictions (implicit in their release decisions) are correlated with the algorithm, but that 
compared to the algorithm, the judges make numerous serious mistakes: they detain many low-risk people 
and release many high-risk ones.161  
 
                                                
156 Rolf Pendall, For Many Low-Income Families, Car May Be Key to Greater Opportunity, URBAN INSTITUTE (2014), 
https://www.urban.org/urban-wire/many-low-income-families-cars-may-be-key-greater-opportunity. 
157 Ibid.  
158 See Gwynn Guilford, American Car Buyers Are Borrowing Like Never Before – And Missing Plenty Off Payments, Too, 
QUARTZ (Feb. 21, 2017), https://qz.com/913093/car-loans-in-the-us-have-hit-record-levels-and-delinquencies-are-rising-fast-
too/.  
159 See Steven Raphael & Lorien Rice, Car Ownership, Employment, and Earnings, 52 J. OF URBAN ECON. 109 (2002).   
160 See Kleinberg, supra note. 
161 In particular, judges seem substantially to over-weight the severity of the current charge (i.e., whatever offense the person 
was arrested for that led them to wind up in court). See id.; Cass R. Sunstein, Algorithms, Correcting Bias, SOCIAL 
RESEARCH (forthcoming 2019). When the judges form their own implicit list of defendants to prioritize for detention based 
on their subjective assessment of defendant risk, the judges wind up putting too many felony arrestees towards the top of their 
list and too many misdemeanor arrestees towards the bottom of the list. But the machine learning algorithm makes clear that 
prior record matters a lot in terms of future risk, and human judges are not fully taking this into account. Kleinberg et al., supra 
note. 
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If we made these decisions using the algorithm’s risk prediction rather than those of the judge, we could 
prioritize detention just for those people who are high risk. Indeed, some of the high-risk people judges 
release are so high risk that if we detained them, we could release multiple low-risk people without 
increasing FTAs. Indeed, if we followed the algorithm’s release recommendations, we could reduce the 
jail population by 42% without increasing FTA rates at all.162 
 
Figure 3 provides a more concrete sense for what this means in practice. In a city in which around 50,000 
people spend time in jail each year, it would mean about 20,000 fewer people spending time behind bars 
on Riker’s Island each year.163 This would be the equivalent of closing Riker’s Island at the end of July 
every year, with no increase in FTA or re-arrests. And note who benefits the most from this large 
reduction in detentions: the two groups who together account for nearly 90% of all current jail spells -- 
African-American and Hispanic defendants.164 This is a disparate benefit, and an especially large one. 
 
D. Algorithms can reveal our own biases 
 
A final potential benefit arises from the fact that algorithms can help reveal our own biases. Imagine a 
large, growing firm that is inundated with job applications. To help prioritize which resumes to consider 
as it hires and expands, the firm builds an algorithm to rank applications. The outcome predicted by this 
algorithm is based on the people the firm’s managers hired in the past. The firm then notices that the new 
algorithm mostly hires men. A possible response would stem from the recognition that the algorithm, 
given how it was constructed, reveals implicit or explicit biases among the firm’s HR team. In that light, 
the firm might try to overcome biased human judgments by building a new algorithm that predicts an 
outcome less infected by human bias, such as a more objective measure of worker productivity once 
hired. A perhaps less helpful response would lose sight of what is responsible for the algorithm’s bias, and 
drop the algorithm altogether to revert back to a purely human hiring process.165 
 
The transparency of algorithms will have other consequences that might be uncomfortable for many 
people. Recall that the disparate impact standard forbids disproportionate adverse effects on members of 
certain groups, unless there is a strong independent justification for the requirement or practice that 
creates those adverse effects. Here we can see the lines blurring between antidiscrimination principles and 
affirmative action.166 Suppose that we have two candidate algorithms to predict worker productivity. One 
of them would lead to hiring a set of workers that is 1% more productive than those hired by the other, but 
reduces the number of minorities hired by 10%. Is this productivity gain large enough to provide “strong 
                                                
162 Id.  
163 See NEW YORK CITY DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTION, NYC DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTION AT A GLANCE (2018), 
https://www1.nyc.gov/assets/doc/downloads/press-release/DOC_At%20a%20Glance-entire_FY%202018_073118.pdf. 
164 These potential gains are not limited to pre-trial release decisions. See Aaron Chalfin et al., Productivity and Selection of 
Human Capital with Machine Learning, 106 AM. ECON. REV.: PAPERS & PROCEEDINGS 124 (2016). Using algorithmic 
predictions rather than human judgment can help police departments hire officers at lower risk for adverse outcomes like 
police-involved shootings, complaints for verbal abuse, or complaints for physical abuse, and can help school systems hire 
more effective teachers. Because police misconduct so disproportionately involves disadvantaged populations, see Roland 
Fryer, Reconciling Results on Racial Differences in Police Shootings, 108 AM. ECON. ASSOC. PAPERS & PROCEEDINGS 228 
(2018), and similarly because the most effective teachers tend to prefer working with the most affluent students leaving the 
least effective to serve disproportionately low-income and often predominantly minority schools, see, e.g., Mimi Engel et al., 
New Evidence on Teacher Labor Supply, 51 AM. EDUC. RES. J. 36 (2014), any system for improving the average quality of 
police officers and teachers will have particularly large benefits for low-income and minority populations. 
165 Interestingly, this is what some media accounts suggest may have happened in 2018 at Amazon. See Reuters, Amazon 
Ditched AI Recruiting Tool That Favored Men for Technical Jobs, THE GUARDIAN, (Oct. 11, 2018), 
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2018/oct/10/amazon-hiring-ai-gender-bias-recruiting-engine. 
166 See Strauss, supra note. 
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independent justification” for that algorithm? Answering that question unavoidably winds up requiring 
value judgments about how to trade off avoidance of disparate racial impacts against other social 
objectives (such as output).  
 
Another way to put it is to say that those who favor affirmative action programs are sometimes willing to 
sacrifice some value for the sake of other goals (such as racial justice as they see it). Those who want to 
prevent disparate impacts, or who want to ensure that any disparate impact is strongly justified, are 
willing to do exactly the same thing. In practice, current antidiscrimination law says that it is worth 
suffering something, but not too much, to stop disparate impacts on (say) African-Americans or women. 
But how much? Algorithms permit unprecedented clarity about these questions by allowing us to specify 
the magnitude of tradeoffs. What if, instead of a 1% productivity gain for a 10% decline in minority 
hiring, it was a 10% productivity gain for a 1% decline in minority hiring? Many people might respond 
that the relevant judgments will depend on the precise numbers, which are typically impossible to 
quantify with “black box” human decision-making. 
 
VII. Conclusion  
 
It is tempting to think that human decision-making is transparent and that algorithms are opaque. We have 
argued here that with respect to discrimination, the opposite is true. The use of algorithms offers far 
greater clarity and transparency about the ingredients and motivations of decisions, and hence far greater 
opportunity to ferret out discrimination.   
 
For those who wish to reduce discriminatory behavior, this is a massive opportunity. Countless decisions 
have the flavor of the screening problems we discuss here; they hinge on a prediction. There is powerful 
evidence of discrimination in current human decision-making. To offer just a few examples: 
  
• Audit studies that randomly assign otherwise-equivalent white and black applicants to apply at 
different firms find that white applicants are called back at more than twice the rate of black 
applicants, 34% versus 14%.167 Reducing this bias would do an enormous amount of social good 
given there are over 6 million job openings in the US at any point in time.168 
• Audit studies of the US housing market, which originates $2 trillion in new mortgages each 
year,169 find	that	minority	borrowers	are	treated	differently	from	and	worse	than	white	borrowers.170 
• Bias also arises in the health sector, which accounts for $3.5 trillion in spending each year in the 
US alone (equal to 18% of GDP).171 For example, when doctors were shown two equivalent 
                                                
167 This figure is for whites and blacks without criminal records. Among those with criminal records we see similarly large 
differences in call-back rates, equal to 17% versus 5%, respectively. See Devah Pager, The Mark of a Criminal Record, 108 
AM. J. SOC. 937 (2003). 
168 Bureau of Labor Statistics, Economic News Release: Job Openings and Labor Turnover Summary, (Jan. 8, 2019), 
https://www.bls.gov/news.release/jolts.nr0.htm. 
169 See Tendayi Kapfidze, U.S. Mortgage Market Statistics: 2018, MAGNIFY MONEY BY LENDING TREE (Dec. 21, 2018), 
https://www.magnifymoney.com/blog/mortgage/u-s-mortgage-market-statistics-2017/.  
170 See Margery Austin Turner et al., All Other Things Being Equal: A Paired Testing Study of Mortgage Lending Institutions – 
Final Report (2002).  
171 CENTERS FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVICES, NATIONAL HEALTH EXPENDITURE DATA FOR 2017 (2018), 
https://www.cms.gov/research-statistics-data-and-systems/statistics-trends-and-reports/nationalhealthexpenddata/nhe-fact-
sheet.html; GDP, THE WORLD BANK, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD. 
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patient histories, the chances of recommending a beneficial procedure (cardiac catheterization) 
were 40% lower for women and minorities than white males.172  
 
For each of these critically important decisions, more and more data are becoming available over time on 
how people in the past made these decisions, the characteristics of these people and their decision-making 
environments, and the consequences of different decisions. These data make it increasingly possible to 
build data-driven statistical prediction models. Those models might be used to detect, reduce, or eliminate 
existing discrimination. 
 
Algorithms have extraordinary promise. They have the potential to make important strides in combating 
discrimination, at least as the legal system has long understood it. But principles of transparency and 
auditability, fair and nondiscriminatory choice of data, and reasonable algorithmic objective are essential, 
not least to help understand and select the tradeoffs that people use algorithms to make.  
 
	
                                                
172 See Kevin Schulman et al., The Effect of Race and Sex on Physicians' Recommendations for Cardiac Catheterization, 340 
NEW ENGLAND J. OF MED. 618 (1999). 
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I. APPENDIX: A CHARACTERIZATION OF ALGORITHMIC BIAS 
 
In this appendix, we justify the claim that algorithmic bias can be decomposed completely into three 
components: bias in the choice of input variables, bias in the choice of outcome measure, and bias in the 
construction of the training procedure.  The disparity that remains after accounting for these three forms 
of bias corresponds to the structural disadvantage of one group relative to another.  
To make this claim precise, we use the following formalism.  Suppose that in a screening problem we 
have applicants from two groups: an advantaged group and a disadvantaged group.  The complete 
description of each applicant is specified by a (long) feature vector 𝑥, and their true productivity is 
specified by a function 𝑓(𝑥) of this feature vector.  
Suppose that in the advantaged group, a 𝑝(𝑥) fraction of the applicants has feature vector 𝑥.  In other 
words, a random applicant drawn from the advantaged group will have feature vector 𝑥 with probability 𝑝(𝑥).  Analogously, in the disadvantaged group, a 𝑞(𝑥) fraction of the applicants have feature vector x.  
Thus, the average productivity of applicants in the advantaged group is the sum over all 𝑥 of 𝑝(𝑥)𝑓(𝑥), 
which we will write more compactly as 𝑝 𝑥 𝑓(𝑥)' , and the average productivity of applicants in the 
disadvantaged group is the corresponding sum 𝑞 𝑥 𝑓(𝑥)' .   
We add one more piece of notation: for any function 𝑣, we let 𝐷(𝑣) denote the difference in the average 
value of 𝑣 between the advantaged and disadvantaged groups; that is, 𝐷 𝑣 = [𝑝 𝑥 − 𝑞 𝑥 ]𝑣(𝑥)' .  
Thus, the difference in average productivity between the two groups is equal to 𝐷(𝑓); we can think of this 
as quantifying the structural disadvantage of one group relative to the other. 
Now, the designer of an algorithm for the screening problem does not have access to the true function 𝑓, 
nor to an applicant’s full feature vector 𝑥.  Instead, the algorithm designer creates a screening rule 
following the process described in the paper.   
• The designer specifies the performance of each applicant using a function 𝑔(𝑥), which will in 
general be different from 𝑓(𝑥).   
• For each applicant, the designer does not use the full feature vector x, but instead a reduced 
representation 𝑟(𝑥).  This means that neither the function 𝑓 nor 𝑔 can be directly applied to the 
representation of an applicant; rather, a function ℎ is applied to 𝑟(𝑥), yielding a value ℎ(𝑟(𝑥)).  
We write ℎ	 ∘ 	𝑟 for the composition of the functions ℎ and 𝑟 (obtained by first applying 𝑟, and 
then applying ℎ); in this notation, the value computed for an applicant with true feature vector 𝑥 is 
(ℎ	 ∘ 	𝑟)(𝑥). 
• Finally, the designer must estimate ℎ from the training data they have collected, and this results in 
a function 𝑡.  Like the function ℎ, this function 𝑡 can be applied to the representation 𝑟(𝑥), 
yielding a value (𝑡	 ∘ 	𝑟)(𝑥). 
The result of this design process is an algorithm that, to an applicant with feature vector 𝑥, assigns a score 
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of (𝑡 ∘ 	𝑟)(𝑥).  The applicants are then ranked by this score, with the highest-scoring applicants selected. 
The difference in average scores assigned to the advantaged and disadvantaged groups is thus 𝐷(𝑡	 ∘ 	𝑟), 
whereas the actual level of structural disadvantage is 𝐷(𝑓).  How should we understand the contrast 
between these two quantities?  The key idea is to write 𝐷(𝑡	 ∘ 	𝑟) in the following extended form: 𝐷(𝑡		 ∘ 	𝑟) 	= 		𝐷(𝑓) 	+	(𝐷(𝑔)	– 	𝐷(𝑓)) 	+	(𝐷(ℎ	 ∘ 	𝑟)	– 	𝐷(𝑔)) 	+	(𝐷(𝑡	 ∘ 	𝑟)	– 	𝐷(ℎ	 ∘ 	𝑟)) 
It is easy to verify that the left- and right-hand sides are equal.  The advantage of the extended formulation 
on the right-hand side is that each of its form terms is directly interpretable, as follows. 
• The first term, 𝐷(𝑓), is the average difference in 𝑓 between the two groups, and hence 
corresponds to the structural disadvantage. 
• The second term, 𝐷(𝑔)	– 	𝐷(𝑓), is the additional bias introduced by the choice of outcome 
measure: 𝑔 instead of 𝑓. 
• The third term, (𝐷(ℎ	 ∘ 	𝑟)	– 	𝐷(𝑔)), is the additional bias introduced by the choice of input 
variables: the reduced representation 𝑟(𝑥) instead of the full feature vector 𝑥. 
• The fourth term, 𝐷(𝑡	 ∘ 	𝑟)	– 	𝐷(ℎ	 ∘ 	𝑟), is the additional bias introduced by the training procedure: 
the fact that we must use an estimated 𝑡	rather than ℎ. 
This equation thus formalizes the sense in which, after accounting for three forms of bias introduced in 
the design of the algorithm – the choice of outcome measure, the choice of input variables, and the design 
of the training procedure – what remains is the level of structural disadvantage between groups.  As 
discussed earlier, we may wish to pursue interventions aimed at reducing all three forms of bias as well as 
the structural disadvantage, but it is important to understand how our interventions are distributed across 
these different effects. 
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Table 1 
Descriptive statistics from NELS dataset for predicting college performance 
 
 Whites Blacks 
N 4,274 469 
College outcomes (2000 follow-up)  
       Graduate with BA by 2000 
       College GPA ≥ 2.75 
       College GPA ≥ 3.25 
 
67.4% 
82.2% 
48.4% 
 
50.9% 
69.5% 
31.1% 
Female 
 
53.2% 
 
56.7% 
 
10th grade NELS test scores (standard deviation = 10) 
       Reading 
       Math 
       Science 
       History 
 
56.3 
57.1 
56.2 
56.0 
 
50.0 
49.5 
47.5 
50.0 
10th grade course grades 
      English: Mostly A’s 
      Math: Mostly A’s 
      Science: Mostly A’s 
      History: Mostly A’s 
 
29.4% 
26.9% 
26.9% 
29.1% 
 
19.6% 
14.9% 
14.4% 
15.7% 
10th grade extracurricular hours per week 
        None  
        0-1 
        1-4 
        5-9 
       10-19 
       20+   
 
21.4% 
16.9% 
21.9% 
16.3% 
17.7% 
  2.1% 
 
30.2% 
14.4% 
23.4% 
13.6% 
11.3% 
   1.2% 
12th grade NELS test scores (standard deviation = 10) 
       Reading 
       Math 
       Science 
       History 
 
56.0 
57.1 
56.2 
56.0 
 
50.0 
49.5 
47.5 
50.0 
Number of credits taken by 12th grade by subject: 
       English 
       Math 
       Science 
       Social Studies 
 
3.6 
3.2 
2.9 
3.1 
 
3.4 
2.9 
2.5 
2.8 
Took SAT 
Took ACT 
60.4% 
52.6% 
63.1% 
37.9% 
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Figure 1 
Fairness vs. efficiency tradeoffs in college admissions using race-aware vs. race-blind algorithms 
 
 
 
Source: Results from Kleinberg, Ludwig, Mullainathan and Rambachan (2018) using data from the NELS:88 to predict college 
performance for those students who attended a four-year college (as measured by GPA<2.75). The graph shows the results of 
rank-ordering all students by predicted performance and simulating an admission rule that admits the top half; the y-axis shows 
the percent of the “admitted class” that goes on to have a GPA below 2.75 (“mostly B’s”) while the x-axis shows the share of 
the admitted students who are African-American. The points in the graph show the result of rank-ordering applicants using 
linear probability models that (a) are “blinded” to any information about each applicant’s race [circle]; (b) use information 
about each applicant’s race to pre-process the data and orthogonalize the predictors to race, so that the average value of high 
school grades, test scores, etc. are now forced to be equal for black and white applicants [triangle]; and (c) use information 
about applicant race to form the prediction model [cross]. For each candidate algorithm, we also show what happens if we use 
our decision-making framework to achieve a target fairness level (share of the admitted college class that is African-
American). Specifically, we take the predictions from a given algorithm, create a list of white applicants rank-ordered by 
predicted college performance, and a different list of black applicants rank-ordered by their predicted college performance, 
then work down the list of black applicants until we hit the target for minority enrollment in the hypothetical “admitted class.” 
We can see that admission decisions using the race-aware algorithm dominate those from the race-blind or the race-
orthogonalized algorithms, in the sense that for any given level of academic performance of the incoming freshman class, the 
race-aware algorithm lets us substantially increase the share of the admitted class that is African-American. 
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Figure 3 
Mis-ranking of African-American applicants by race-blind algorithm 
 
 
 
 
Source: Kleinberg, Ludwig, Mullainathan and Rambachan (2018). Using data from the NELS:88 dataset, we first predict for 
each observation their predicted college performance (measured as Y=1 if GPA<2.75) using an algorithm that is blinded to 
applicant race, and then again using an algorithm that has access to each applicant’s race. We then take the sample of black 
students in the NELS:88 and use their predicted values to bin them into deciles based on the race-blind predictions (x-axis) and 
race-aware predictions (y-axis). If the two models rank-ordered everyone the same way, all the data would be along the 45-
degree line. The “off diagonals” in the figure show mis-ranking. 
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Figure 3 
Pre-trial detention rates in New York City under current human (judge) decisions versus algorithmic 
release rule that holds failure to appear (FTA) rate constant at current level 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Kleinberg, Lakkaraju, Leskovec, Ludwig and Mullainathan (2018). “Human decisions” represent current outcomes 
from the existing criminal justice system, which technically combines the input of judges, district attorneys, public defenders 
and a six-item risk check-list created by a local non-profit, the Criminal Justice Agency. “Machine decisions” represent the 
hypothetical detention outcomes if one were to make pre-trial detention versus release decisions using a machine learning 
algorithm (gradient boosted trees) to predict defendant risk, rank order defendants by risk, and detain only the number of 
defendants needed to keep the failure to appear rate constant at current levels.  
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